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Abstract
The first chapter of this thesis explores the link between a government’s 
political power and its choice between patronage and meritocracy in the re­
cruitment and promotion of state bureaucrats. Evidence suggests tha t where 
political power is concentrated, governments are less likely to renounce pa­
tronage. A theoretical analysis suggests two reasons for this negative corre­
lation. First, under patronage, governments can ensure bureaucratic compe­
tence only when they are powerful, while meritocracy guarantees competence 
regardless of the distribution of power. Secondly, a weak government intro­
duces meritocracy to prevent the new incoming government from exerting 
its political influence over the composition of bureaucracy via patronage.
The second chapter (joint paper with Maitreesh Ghatak) examines why 
not-for-profits are most active in mission-based sectors and why they are able 
to attract more motivated workers. Francois (2000) argues that choosing 
not-for-profit status enables the firm’s manager to commit to a hands-off 
policy, and consequently to use worker’s intrinsic motivation more effectively. 
However, it can be shown tha t this is not always in the interest of the 
manager and tha t it is never in the interest of the worker. Not-for-profits 
only emerge if there is an oversupply of motivated labour.
The third chapter studies the role of political neutrality as a norm for 
state bureaucrats. The norm of political neutrality can be interpreted as an 
agreement to keep the bureaucrat’s preferences hidden. Drawing on a theo­
retical analysis of the conflict of interest between bureaucrat and politician, 
this chapter shows tha t having no information on the bureaucrat’s political 
views can improve the communication between politician and bureaucrat. 
This way, political neutrality can improve public decision making.
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Preface
When starting my undergraduate studies in economics, I was truly convinced 
tha t it best reflected my interests. My interests were, and still are, well 
described by the specialization I had chosen in my German A-levels: politics, 
mathematics and physics.
Not surprisingly, I was let down by my undergraduate programme. There 
was plenty of mathematics and even some reminiscence to  the natural forces 
of physics. But politics rarely entered. Finally, after two years of study, I 
was confronted with the field of political economy. The course taught the 
classic models derived from ideas by scholars like Niskanen and Downs. The 
underlying view on politics felt frustrating. At th a t time, my mother worked 
as a public servant and my father as a member of parliament. Were they 
really just maximizing slack and votes? Had they fooled me so well with 
their political debates and rage over newspaper articles?
In the final stages of writing my doctoral thesis I suddenly recalled this 
feeling of doubt and puzzlement tha t I felt at the time. And I understood 
tha t my research takes a part of its motivation from tha t feeling ten years 
ago.
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Introduction
The title of this thesis reflects two connecting elements, common to all the 
three articles tha t constitute this thesis. All three chapters introduce simple 
microeconomics models in order to analyze the effect of intrinsic motiva­
tion (broadly defined) on the interaction between individuals inside orga­
nizations. The three theoretical models borrow mostly from organizational 
economics and are then applied to discuss issues in political economy and 
development economics.
This thesis follows a single methodological approach. It observes exist­
ing institutions (bureaucracies and not-for-profit firms) and analyzes differ­
ent aspects of their purpose and effectiveness. My goal is to construct the 
simplest possible models to capture essential elements of each studied insti­
tution. Using this approach, these papers suggest links between observable 
variables such as institutions, market characteristics, and macroeconomic 
variables. They thus lay ground for future empirical research.
At the outset, two limitations of this approach must be pointed out. 
First, the use of simple models might raise doubts about the generality of 
the suggested mechanisms. While a general model is a credible signal for a 
general mechanism, a model tha t uses specific functional forms is not. I/w e 
tried to compensate for this lack of generality by critically reflecting on some 
of the underlying assumptions. Secondly, the theoretical predictions have 
not been empirically tested and therefore do not offer more than conceptual 
clarifications. Nonetheless, in order to demonstrate the relevance of the 
theory, the papers relate to existing empirical findings, where possible.
The first chapter of this thesis consists of my job market paper which 
explores the link between a government’s political power and its choice be­
l l
tween patronage and meritocracy in the recruitment and promotion of state 
bureaucrats. In this paper, I argue tha t institutions which govern recruit­
ment and promotion within state bureaucracies, can be understood as a 
political state variable affected by the degree to which different groups in 
society have access to political power. Where political power is concentrated 
in the hands of one group, the system of political allocation of bureaucratic 
posts (patronage) has few disadvantages for the political elite. However, 
where political power is shared between different groups, patronage leads to 
an unpredictable bias in recruitment and bureaucratic incompetence. Under 
these conditions, the optimal choice for the incumbent would be to renounce 
patronage and introduce meritocratic recruitment. In order to illustrate this 
theoretical argument, I discuss the case of bureaucratic reforms in 19th cen­
tury Britain. In addition, I present cross-country data to show tha t bureau­
cratic institutions and political institutions are correlated in ways predicted 
by the theory.
This paper contributes to the existing literature in several ways. To my 
knowledge, this is the first paper tha t explicitly models patronage and mer­
itocracy as two sets of institutions governing recruitment and promotion in 
the state bureaucracy. The theoretical model developed in this paper could 
provide a micro foundation for related work in development economics tha t 
is more concerned with aggregate outcomes.1 Moreover, the model allows 
for an analysis of the welfare effects of bureaucratic institutions. In particu­
lar, it explains why government decisions usually benefit from meritocracy. 
At the same time, the model also reveals tha t the efficiency costs attributed 
to political involvement in recruitment and promotion2 could be dependant
xFor example Besley and Persson (2007) or Acemoglu et al (2006).
2See for example the evaluation of the Political Risk Services (www.prsgroup.com)
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on the country-specific political environment.
The second chapter includes a paper resulting from joint work with 
Maitreesh Ghatak. The goal of this paper is to generalize the model of not- 
for-profit organizations by Patrick Francois (2000). In his paper, Francois 
shows tha t worker’s intrinsic motivation in an organization can be crowded 
out if managers are too motivated to provide output in case the worker 
shirks. According to Francois, the reduction of financial incentives in not- 
for-profit firms will lead to the possibility of wage reductions. Building on 
his argument, our paper develops a simple sequential-move game to show 
th a t the link between not-for-profit provision and wage reductions indeed 
exists. However, we also show tha t the reduction of financial incentives is 
generally linked to a reduction of efficiency. If managers and workers can 
self-select into organizations, the not-for-profit setting is crowded out.
This result is not surprising given tha t Francois’ assumptions do not 
actually imply contractual failure as defined by Hansmann (1980), i.e. a 
failure to write specific contracts between the manager of the firm and its 
patron. Rather, the contractual failure is an internal one between manager 
and worker. As a consequence, the not-for-profit cannot be regarded as a 
solution to a conflict between the goals of the organization and society but 
between manager and worker. Where this is indeed the case, the social value 
of not-for-profit firms might need to be reconsidered.
While this model might not apply generally, there are signs tha t the 
conflict between managers and workers in organizational choice is not un­
realistic. In particular, the theory predicts that workers with low labour 
market power are more often found working for not-for-profit firms. As we 
show in our paper, recent empirical studies are compatible with this result, 
which seems to equate bureaucratic quality with bureaucratic independance.
13
This paper contributes to the existing literature since neither the theoretical 
finding nor its empirical implications have been noted elsewhere.
The third chapter explores the role of political neutrality as a norm for 
state bureaucrats, often associated with modern civil service institutions. In 
this paper, I suggest tha t the norm of political neutrality can be interpreted 
as an agreement to keep the bureaucrat’s preferences hidden. The model 
shows tha t where these preferences are not revealed to the politician, com­
munication between the bureaucrat and politician can improve sufficiently 
to justify neutrality from the politician’s point of view. The underlying intu­
ition of the theoretical finding is tha t the politician heads more to the advice 
tha t comes from a bureaucrat whose motives he does not know. This, in 
turn, makes the bureaucrat exaggerate less.
However, it can be shown tha t the politician always prefers to have a bu­
reaucrat tha t shares his ideological views to not knowing the bureaucrat’s 
type. This finding links the discussion in this chapter to the discussion 
about meritocracy and patronage in the first chapter. If competence con­
siderations lead to the establishment of a permanent bureaucracy tha t is 
recruited without the influence of politicians, it might be useful to require 
the bureaucracy to remain politically neutral In other words, once meritoc­
racy is introduced (for reasons stated in the first chapter), political neutrality 
is the answer to the constrained maximization problem of a permanent civil 
service. This conclusion explains not only how political neutrality fits into a 
theoretical framework that takes political preferences as exogenous, but also 
why neutrality became much more im portant with the rise of civil service 
institutions. Both the specific theoretical argument and the application to 
bureaucratic institutions in this paper are unique.
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1 Patronage or Meritocracy: The Role o f Political 
Power
1.1 In tr o d u c tio n
Recent research highlights the importance of institutions for economic wel­
fare.3 Governments play a central role in the provision of this institutional 
framework. Success, however, varies significantly across time and country. 
A natural starting point for understanding this variation is government it­
self. The largest share of government, regardless of the political system, 
consists of bureaucrats. Given their influence on policy-making it is likely 
th a t selecting competent bureaucrats is a good way to increase a state’s 
capacity to further growth.4 But while the selection method for politicians 
has received considerable attention, the selection method for bureaucrats 
remains under-researched.
Recruitment and promotion of bureaucrats can be broadly categorized 
into two different systems - patronage and meritocracy. Patronage gives the 
political leadership of the executive free hand in allocating government posts 
and firing staff. Under meritocracy, the political leadership cedes some or 
all of this power to a third party, usually a commission, th a t is supposed to 
select the most able candidate for a post. This article provides a theoretical 
framework to  explain why a country adopts one system or another and 
whether this choice maximizes welfare.
We start by observing a simple regularity. Several Western European 
states introduced im portant building blocks of a meritocratic recruitment
1 Examples are Acemoglu and Johnson (2005), World Bank (2004), Djankov et al (2002), 
Glaeser and Shleifer (2002), Acemoglu at al (2001) or Hall and Jones (1999).
4See for example Page and Jenkins (2005), Dolan (2000), La Porta et al (1999), Evans 
(1995) and Wilson (1989) for related evidence.
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system (a civil service commission, state exams etc.) in times of democrati­
zation. This historical pattern in Europe is matched by the existing cross­
country data. Countries tha t recruit the heads of their executive through 
elections, tend to recruit their bureaucrats through state exams - political 
institutions and bureaucratic institutions are correlated. We interpret this 
correlation as a link between a high concentration of political power and the 
use of patronage.5
Our key assumption is th a t the bureaucratic system is a state variable 
tha t cannot be changed in the present. Hence, meritocracy effectively re­
duces the influence of future governments on bureaucratic recruitment and 
promotion. We show tha t this commitment to recruitment by merit is par­
ticularly attractive if the incumbent and his supporters are politically weak. 
One reason is tha t recruitment by a neutral commission is more desirable to 
him than recruitment by the opposition. Political institutions tha t give less 
power to specific groups therefore favor the introduction of meritocracy.
More importantly, perhaps, meritocracy improves competence in a sit­
uation in which power is shared between different groups. The underlying 
reason is that the disregard of group membership facilitates competition 
between candidates of diverging political views. Similar to politicians, bu­
reaucrats are then motivated by the wish to implement their political ideas. 
Patronage, on the other hand, biases recruitment because politicians have 
an incentive to select candidates tha t match their political views. We show 
tha t this makes patronage surprisingly effective if political power is in the 
hand of just one group. It fails, however, if power is shared more equally.
J We define political power as influence on the selection of state leaders. A high concen­
tration of power implies that a specific group selects the government while a low concen­
tration of power implies that different groups in society have an influence on the decision. 
A change from monarchy to democracy, for example, distributes power more equally.
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In order to prevent confusion it should be stressed tha t patronage as 
defined in this article is not identical to the use of public employment to 
gather political support which is the usual definition in the existing litera­
ture.6 Our analysis shows, however, tha t patronage as defined here (control 
over recruitment) can also have important effects on the political arena. 
If the political head of the executive recruits its bureaucrats then this in­
creases the stakes in the selection of the head. This increase in stakes is 
a welcome stabilizing factor for governments with powerful support as it 
motivates their power base. If political power is shared more equally, how­
ever, increased stakes can become a destabilizing factor. A weak incumbent 
might therefore introduce meritocratic recruitment to reduce pressures for 
political change.
The theoretical framework also allows us to draw conclusions about the 
effect of bureaucratic structure on bureaucratic competence and welfare. 
While meritocracy is generally more efficient, it can be dominated by a 
combination of power monopoly and patronage. An analysis of the incum­
bent’s choice shows tha t if the need for bureaucratic specialization is low, 
bureaucratic competence is reached by his choice. If bureaucrats need to 
incur high investments into competence to become effective, however, the 
incumbent’s choice will be biased in favor of patronage. Weak common in­
terests in society, high polarization and the importance of private benefits 
from maintaining patronage then all play a role in preventing meritocratic 
reforms. These findings seem compatible with some of the empirical findings 
in the development literature.7
6See Enikolopov (2007), Acemoglu et al (2006) or Goldman (2003) for recent examples. 
For an early reference see Wilson (1961).
'For examples see Esterly and Levine (1997) and Besley and Persson (2007).
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In summary, this article explains bureaucratic institutions through the 
distribution of political power and shows how the quality of bureaucratic de­
cisions is affected. It is tempting to consider the resulting messages for the 
reduced form - the impact of shared power on economic performance. We 
show tha t shared power should go hand in hand with competent decision­
making because it tends to increase the attractiveness of meritocratic in­
stitutions. The bureaucratic performance of power monopolies lies slightly 
above this benchmark if little specialization is required of bureaucrats but 
performs worse otherwise.8 Incomplete sharing of power leads to inefficient 
bureaucracies if it does not lead to meritocracy.
The article is structured as follows. In the next section we illustrate our 
main argument using the example of reforms in 19th century Britain. The 
remainder of section 2 explains why we are hopeful tha t these mechanisms 
have power outside of the United Kingdom. In section 1.3 we present a brief 
overview of some related literature. Section 1.4 contains the basic framework 
and section 1.5 derives the main results. We conclude with a discussion of 
our findings in section 1.6.
1 .2  P o lit ic a l P ow er an d  B u rea u cra tic  S tru c tu re
The question of how to measure meritocracy is not straightforward. Two 
institutional features seem to be particularly im portant in this context: the 
use of entry examination in recruitment and restraints on arbitrary removal. 
While this is obviously not perfect, we will focus mostly on the introduction 
of entry exams as a sign of meritocratic recruitment.
We model political power as the influence of a group on government
8This finding seems broadly consistent with recent findings by Besley and Kudamatsu 
(2007).
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selection. We assume tha t the distribution of this power can partly be mea­
sured by observable institutional characteristics like free and fair elections 
or hereditary rule.
1.2.1 T he Introduction  o f S ta te  E xam inations in B ritain
W ithin the range of possible systems for recruitment and promotion, the 
merit system in the United Kingdom is relatively radical when it comes to 
the application of the merit principle9. The starting point of institutional­
ized meritocratic recruitment in England lies in the 19th century.
At the beginning of the 19th century, patronage and sale of offices was 
common in Britain while objective indicators of competence or skill hardly 
played any role in recruitment. This is revealed in a minute of the treasury 
from the year 1820. The document stresses that men previously convicted of 
revenue offences should not be appointed as customs officials.10 Amongst the 
benefactors of this system of patronage were the members of the parliament 
which represented the interests of the old and new upper classes.
The struggle for the introduction of the merit system began in 1853 when 
Charles Trevelyan and Stafford Northcote were asked by the then Chancellor 
of the Exchequer, William Gladstone, to write a report on its recruitment 
and promotion. In 1854, the Northcote Trevelyan report was published. On 
its first page, the report motivates the reform.
The great and increasing accumulation of public business, and the con­
sequent pressure upon the Government, need only be alluded to; and the 
inconveniences which are inseparable from the frequent changes which take
9See Frey (2000) for a striking comparison with the United States system.
10 See Greaves (1945)
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place in the responsible administration are matter of sufficient notoriety.11
The main aim of the proposed reforms was therefore to generate a body 
of permanent officers tha t was ‘able to advise, assist, and to some extent 
influence those who are from time to time set over them ’.12
It is the emphasis of government change as a motive for reform tha t 
suggests a connection to political reforms at the time. W ith the rising 
power of the parliament in the nineteenth century, the prerogative power of 
the crown had come to be increasingly taken over by ministers who were 
held accountable by parliament.13 At the same time, parliament itself was 
undergoing revolutionary change. It had received more powers and following 
the first reform act in 1832 it had become more representative in the sense 
th a t the middle classes had gained the right to vote.
In summary, the timing of British reforms and the arguments of North­
cote and Trevelyan indicate a link between a more broadly shared access to 
the executive, increasing volatility and a reduction in quality of governance. 
Which factors were responsible for this link? There are some signs tha t the 
reformers of the 19th century were particularly concerned about the effect 
of political influence in distorting recruitment.
This becomes clear with a more detailed look at the British reform 
debate. An integral part of this debate, involving scholars like Mill and 
Malthus, were the ongoing reforms in the East India Company. A central 
aim of these reforms was to improve bureaucratic performance by decreasing 
the influence of the British political elite on recruitment. Describing what 
he believed to be recruitment and promotion by merit in the East India
11 Northcote and Trevelyan (1954), p. 1 (reprint)
12 Northcote and Trevelyan (1954), p. 1 (reprint)
13See Finer (1956) for an early discussion.
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company John Stuart Mill14, for example, argues
A second great advantage of the present system is, that those who are 
sent out as candidates to rise by degrees are generally unconnected with the 
influential classes in the country, and out of the range o f Parliamentary 
influence. The consequence is, that those who have the disposal of offices in 
India have little or no motive to put unfit persons into important situations
l - P
It is the motive to recruit unfit persons that seems to be a key ingredient 
in making patronage a bad choice. Meritocratic promotion was seen as a 
way to improve competence in this context.16
W hatever the merits of meritocracy, the application to  the administra­
tion in Britain faced considerable resistance. Northcote and Trevelyan had 
proposed to modify recruitment procedures through the introduction of an 
entry examination for all public servants, administered by an independent 
Board of Examiners. Unsurprisingly, one of the strongest opponents of this 
new way of recruitment was the parliament.
Due to the high resistance to the reforms, their implementation took 
considerable time. Patronage persisted despite the foundation of a civil 
service commission in 1855 and state exams were not introduced until 1870 
- after a second extension of voting rights in 1867. One interpretation of 
the timing of events is tha t the still relatively rich members of parliament
14 See Ryan (1972) for a revealing account of John Stuart Mill’s arguements and his 
influence on the Northcote Trevelyan report.
15J.S.Mill, cited in Ryan (1972), p. 44
16How little in this fact seemed to have changed over the years is revealed by a recent 
report by the UK House of Commons Public Administration Select Committee. The report 
concludes: On a purely utilitarian basis, there remains a strong case for an impartial 
civil service. In Northcote Trevelyan terms, even when appointment from outside becomes 
routine, able people are encouraged to apply to the public service because they know that 
appointment will be on merit, not by patronage. Politics and Administration: Ministers 
and Civil Servants. Third Report of Session 2006-07, p. 26.
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feared th a t the control over recruitment could fall into the hands of the lower 
classes.17 When pressures to extend voting rights grew in the mid 1860s, 
the members of parliament preferred to transfer powers to the commission.
Following this interpretation, the merit system was endorsed by parlia­
ment because it kept recruitment out of the grasp of a future government 
with different policy preferences. This seems to add a separate argument 
to the concerns of competence and efficiency stressed by Northcote and 
Trevelyan. We will show th a t both arguments are connected to the distrib­
ution of political power.
1.2.2 Em pirical E vidence
Table 1 (p. 56) summarizes some of the time-lines in the introduction of 
the civil service in Western Europe. While the correlation between crude 
indicators of changes in political power and the merit system is not straight­
forward, the introduction of state examinations always coincides with polit­
ical changes leading to a significant increase in political competition. The 
example of Spain is particularly striking as meritocracy was introduced in 
the relatively chaotic political environment of the 1910s but later reversed 
under dictatorship.
A similar relationship seems to be at work in the United States (US). 
Ruhil and Camoes (2003) show tha t electoral competition was a key pre­
dictor of adoptions at the state level. One standard deviation in closeness 
more than doubled the chance tha t a state adopted competitive state ex­
aminations between 1900 and 1939. Horn (1995) argues tha t US presidents 
expanded the merit system when oppositional groups were about to gain 
political influence.
17Gowan (1984) makes this point.
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Turning towards patterns in the cross-section there is some evidence tha t 
a broad participation in formal power is not only correlated with the use of 
state exams but with de-politicization more in general. One striking example 
can be found in the summary of a detailed analysis of eight Asian economies 
in Burns and Bowornwathana (2001). In their summary, the editors develop 
an informal ranking of politicization. The ranking of politicization coincides 
perfectly with political system - the three well-established democracies in 
the sample exhibit the highest degree of bureaucratic autonomy.18
D ata gathered by James Rauch and Peter Evans offers the opportunity to 
take a more systematic look at the relationship between the merit principle 
and shared formal power. Their data-set is based on a standardized survey 
conducted with leading civil servants in 35 countries19 th a t asks respondents 
to give an estimate of what proportion of higher officials in their agency 
entered the civil service via a formal examination system. The resulting 
index gives the average answer score for each country ranging from 1 (less 
than 30 percent) to 4 (more than 90 percent). This data is matched with 
measure of political institutions from the PolityIV data set in the 1970s. The 
index we use categorizes the system of executive recruitment in selection and 
election20. The association between these political institutions and the use 
of state exams is displayed in figure 1. It reveals a relatively high use of 
state exams in countries which feature elections.21
1HIndia, Japan and South Korea have the most autonomous bureaucracies. Bangladesh, 
Philippines and Thailand rank moderately in terms of bureaucratic politicization. China 
and Laos exhibit considerable restrictions in bureaucratic autonomy.
1!>For its small sample size, the dataset is very diverse. Africa, America, Asia and 
Europe are all equally represented.
20The index also features mixed systems and countries that have no regulated way into 
the executive. We drop these observations. Mixed systems are included again in the 
regression analysis to gain more sample size (4 countries).
21 Table 2 (p. 57) confirms that political institutions (selected, mixed, elected) are a 
relatively strong predictor of the use of state exams in this small sample of countries. The
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Executive Selected Executive Elected
Political Institutions
Figure 1: Political Institutions and the Use of State Exams
The simple correlation is confirmed by data provided by the Political 
Risk Survey Group. The group provides a measure of bureaucratic quality 
for more than 100 countries tha t measures the degree to which the bureau­
cracy of a country is permanent, independent and has its own established 
mechanism for recruitment and training.22 Again, the mean of bureaucratic 
quality is systematically lower in countries in which the executive is selected.
Given the unobserved heterogeneity and measurement error problems 
we do not think these correlations between elections and prevalence of the 
merit principle should enjoy too much confidence. However, to the extent
index also stays significant when controlling for legal origin, ethnic fragmentation and 
GDP per capita (19801. Solittiner the indicator for the Dolitical svstem u d  into its sub-
and selected governments less.
22The exact wording on their website www.prsgroup.com is: High points are given to 
countries where the bureaucracy has the strength and expertise to govern without drastic 
changes in policy or interruptions in government services. In these low-risk countries, 
the bureaucracy tends to be somewhat autonomous from political pressure and to have an 
established mechanism for recruitment and training.
tha t the results in table 2 (p. 56) are not driven by any of the econometric 
concerns, they confirm a complementarity between broadly shared political 
power and low political involvement in bureaucratic recruitment.
1.3  R e la te d  L itera tu re
Bureaucracies are important for economic outcomes. The fact tha t much 
of the empirical work uses some indicator of bureaucratic performance2 3  to 
measure institutions is indicative of this importance. A more direct way 
to measure the importance of bureaucrats is to look at their involvement 
in policy making. Page and Jenkins (2005) give a detailed overview of the 
activities of UK officials. Their interviews found tha t 50 percent of officials 
in their sample were involved in policy production . 2 4  Similar evidence for 
the members of the Senior Executive Service (SES) in the United States is 
provided by Dolan (2000) whose results suggest even higher rates of involve­
ment. Again, bureaucrats do not only implement but propose and initiate 
policies themselves.
There are few studies tha t try to show tha t bureaucratic recruitment 
matters for outcomes. Two exceptions are the cross-country study by Rauch 
and Evans (1999) and a study by Nistotskaya (2007) for Russian states which 
confirm a positive effect of meritocratic recruitment on outcomes like cor­
ruption, competence and regional growth. While both works face the usual 
econometric concerns of cross-sectional work they are at least indicative of 
a role for meritocracy.
A natural starting point for a theoretical inquiry into the role of bureau­
23 These are, for example, the difficulties in resolving the case of unpaid commercial 
debt, time and cost of registering a business or the ability of the state to gather taxes.
24 Page (2003) describes in detail how this involvement entails drafting whole pieces of 
legislation.
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crats is recent work by Alesina and Tabellini (2007). Building on the career 
concerns model of Holmstrom (1999), they analyze the comparative advan­
tages of politicians and bureaucrats in different policy tasks. Their model 
can be used to explain variations between patronage and meritocracy2 5  be­
cause bureaucrats recruited in a patronage system share the re-election in­
centives of politicians while bureaucrats under meritocracy fit well to their 
description of bureaucrats. However, there are two problems with a direct 
application of their findings. First, their model predicts tha t an increase 
in political accountability increases the bureaucrat’s effort under patronage 
but not under meritocracy . 2 6  If elections imply accountability this should 
associate them with patronage not meritocracy. Secondly, our main goal 
is to explain why politicians might prefer one bureaucratic system over an­
other. This is not identical to the normative question of which system is 
more efficient.
Another closely related work is Maskin and Tirole (2004). They model 
the choice of an electorate amongst three institutions: direct democracy, 
representative democracy and judicial power. Both representative democ­
racy and judicial power have the advantage tha t they allocate the decision 
to an informed agent. Under representative democracy, however, this agent 
has a dynamic incentive to pander to the voter. Similar to Morris (2001), ac­
countability therefore creates a loss of information. Judicial power is chosen 
over representative democracy if the loss of information is more im portant 
than the weeding out of nonaligned decision-makers.
A similar trade-off is used in Hanssen (2004) to explain the introduction
25T w o  empirical enquriries that relate to this approach are Enikolopov (2007) and Rauch 
(1995).
26 De Figueiredo (2002) uses a similar argument to show that the ’insulation’ of the 
bureaucracy is a problem.
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of judicial independence. His work is closely related to this article as he 
introduces a model that captures the effect of political competition. In his 
model, an incumbent chooses judicial independence if the judge hired today 
is sufficiently aligned compared to a judge chosen by a future government un­
der judicial dependence. He argues that both increasing re-election chances 
and rising polarization make judicial independence more attractive for an 
incumbent. The resulting model is complementary to the one discussed here 
as it captures the role of firing restrictions - the second pillar of meritocracy 
next to recruitment and promotion by merit. However, his model does not 
offer any insights into the effects of institution on competence.
Competence considerations, however, might be im portant for evaluating 
bureaucratic performance. Max Weber’s ideal type bureaucracy, for exam­
ple, has specialized knowledge at its core. 2 7  We support this notion by 
showing tha t competence might be a decisive welfare criterion in evaluating 
bureaucratic structures. Our analysis ignores the issues of control that spe­
cialized knowledge might entail. 2 8  W hat remains is the problem of selecting 
competent bureaucrats.
We assume tha t the problem of selecting bureaucrats is complicated by 
the existence of different political views. An im portant element of political 
preferences is tha t they affect the effectiveness of a given match between 
politician and bureaucrat . 2 9  This relates our analysis of bureaucrat selection 
to  Besley and Ghatak (2005) who use similar arguments to explain the role 
of a mission oriented sector in the provision of some services. An im portant
27 First published 1922. For a description see Weber (1988), section III, paragraph 4.
28This problem has been analyzed in detail by Aghion and Tirole (1997) and Dessein 
(2002) for example.
29 Some evidence that this motivation might be important is provided by studies like 
Aberbach et al (1981), Edwards et al (1981) or Aberbach and Rockman (2000) or the 
discussion in Wilson (1989).
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difference is tha t bureaucrats in our model derive some of their political 
motivation from political conflict. Political conflict as an incentive is well 
established in the analysis of politicians .3 0  We show here that meritocracy 
can put similar motives to a productive use in bureaucracies.
Conceptually, this article relates to the discussion of the strategic ma­
nipulation of political state variables . 31 State debt, for example, is shown 
to be higher if the future government has a different preference for how it 
spends public funds. We argue here that the bureaucratic system can be 
regarded a political state variable. A problem with this application is, of 
course, tha t re-election likelihoods are likely affected by institutional choices. 
It is therefore necessary to model the re-election process explicitly.
1 .4  T h e  M o d e l
In what follows, we develop a model tha t relates political power, bureaucratic 
structure and bureaucratic quality. In particular, we analyze the behavior of 
two candidates who compete for a post inside the bureaucracy by investing 
into competence. The resulting model can be applied more generally to 
analyze incentives given by promotion inside the bureaucracy.
1.4.1 Set up
Consider a society in which there are two types of individuals, t E {0,1}, 
who we will call left (t =  0) and right (t = 1). The task of bureaucracy is 
to match a policy x  € {0,1} to a state of the world m  € {0 ,1 } . The prior 
of all actors concerning m  is tha t both states occur with probability All
30See for example Besley and Coate (1997), Caillaud and Tirole (2002) or Osborne and 
Slivinski (1996).
31 For more examples see Colomer (2005), Lagunoff (2001) or summaries offered in Pers- 
son and Tabellini (2000).
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individuals in society have the following utility from decision x
U(x, m , t ) =  I ( x  = m)7r +  I (x  = t)r
where I  is an indicator function tha t takes the value I  = 1 if the condition 
inside the bracket is met and 1 = 0 otherwise. For example, a left individual 
(t =  0) receives TJ = t v  + t  if x = m  = 0 but only U = t v  if x = m  = 1.
In this set-up all individuals receive the same benefit from matching 
policy to state, x  = m. But there is a potential conflict between individuals 
of different types because x = t can only be satisfied for one type at a time. 
The component r  therefore captures group-specific taste or group-specific 
economic characteristics that have an effect on the benefit from the policy. 
Another interpretation is tha t t v  captures the benefits from efficient public 
good provision while r  captures the redistribute elements of state policy. 
In any case, high values of r  relative to t v  imply tha t society is politically 
polarized.
We model the choices of four actors: a left incumbent, a right challenger 
and two candidates for the civil service, one of each type. Before the game 
starts, the incumbent decides on the bureaucratic system, S  G {m erit,pa tr}. 
The choice of S  governs the rules of bureaucratic recruitment discussed 
below. When choosing S , the incumbent maximizes the expected value of 
U (x , m, t ) plus a rent, R , gained by the politician in power. 3 2
After the decision on S  the candidates for the bureaucratic job invest 
in competence. They decide on their investment levels, e G {e/,e^} with 
1 >  eh > ei > 0. If a candidate invests, her investment level is e = eh and
32 This rent represents pecuniary benefits (for example corruption) or non-pecuniary 
benefits (for example prestige) of public office.
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she pays a cost c > 0. A candidate decides on her investment by maximizing 
the expected value of U (x ,m , t ) minus the cost of investment.
The investment cost c plays an im portant role for the choice between 
meritocracy and patronage. We interpret this cost as the need to specialize 
in order to become effective for policy-making. Posts tha t require a lot of 
specialized knowledge then go hand in hand with higher costs . 3 3
In their investment decision, candidates take into account whether the 
incumbent will stay in power or be replaced by his right competitor. The 
likelihood that the incumbent will stay in power is determined by a political 
contest between the two groups in which the more powerful group is more 
likely to prevail. We model this struggle for power as an election in which 
(a subset of) society decides whether to keep the left incumbent in office or 
replace him by the right challenger. Details are discussed below, for now we 
denote the resulting probability of re-election of the incumbent
p = Pr(re-election | S ).
Bureaucratic recruitment takes place after the type of the politician is 
determined by the struggle for power. The rules for this recruitment are 
determined by the bureaucratic system 5. If S  = m erit a neutral commis­
sion decides who to recruit. The commission recruits the candidate with the 
highest investment and tosses a fair coin if both candidates have the same 
level of competence. If S  = patr the politician in power picks his bureaucrat 
under full knowledge of type and investment level.
After one of the candidates is recruited to become the bureaucrat, she
33 Note that costs include opportunity costs. This is particularly relevant when wages 
within the public sector are lower than in the private sector and competent public decision­
making requires public sector experience.
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observes the state of the world m  E {0,1} with probability e. She then picks 
policy x  6 {0,1} to maximize U (x ,m ,t) .
Figure 2 visualizes the timing of events. It should be stressed tha t the 
bureaucratic system is a political state variable in this game. The incumbent 
chooses the method of recruitment for a future government and will therefore 
try  to influence its choice of policy, x, indirectly.
Left incumbent picks Incumbent remains in power Bureaucrat observes state m with
bureaucratic system, S with probability p(S) probability e and picks policy x
Candidates invest in One candidate is
expertise e at cost c  recruited as bureaucrat
Figure 2: Game Structure
In what follows, we solve the game through backwards induction. The 
solution then builds the backbone for the next section in which we discuss 
under what param eter values the left incumbent introduces recruitment by 
merit and whether this choice maximizes welfare.
1.4.2 T he B ureaucrat’s P olicy  Choice
In the last stage, the bureaucrat observes the state m  with probability e and 
decides on policy x. In her choice, she maximizes her expected utility
U (x, m, t ) =  I (x  = m) 7r +  I (x  = t)r.
Remember that her prior is m  = 1 with probability This immediately 
implies tha t when uninformed, she maximizes expected utility by matching 
x  to her own type t.
In case she is informed, her decision depends crucially on the level of 
polarization in society. If r  < tt the policy will be matched to the state of
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the world (x = m) even if this means giving up r .  If r  >  7r, however, the 
bureaucrat always sets x  = t. This means tha t information and competence 
loose their purpose if r  >  tt. Given that investment is costly, this instantly 
implies tha t investment is always 0  in this case.
We will therefore focus on low levels of polarization (r  < tr) for now 
and discuss the much simpler case of high polarization (r  >  t t )  in the last 
section.
1.4.3 R ecruitm ent
Recruitment under patronage follows the preferences of the politician in 
power. The expected value of the two different bureaucrat-politician matches 
are therefore important. Denote the expected political payoff an individual 
of type i receives from bureaucrat of type j  by U f.
The expected utility for the politician of type t G {0,1} from a bureau­
crat of his own type with investment e is
U} =  +  t ) +  ^ (e7r +  ( 1  -  e)r) .
To understand this formula, note first tha t the prior of the politician is 
th a t both the state m  = 0 and m  = 1 arise with probability If m  = t 
there is no case in which the bureaucrat misses x = m  because every time 
when uninformed she picks policy x  = t. T hat explains the first term. If 
m  =£ t, however, the policy can not match the state of the world and the 
type at the same time. Either the bureaucrat is informed and picks x = m  
or she is uninformed and picks x = t. The level of investment therefore only 
m atters in tha t state. Note tha t because t t  > r  expected utility is strictly 
increasing in e.
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The politician expects the following utility from a match with an opposite 
type
Ui t =  \'K  +  \< 'K  +  T)-
Comparing this expected utility we see that at any given level of e <  1  
the congruent bureaucrat provides a higher expected utility to the politician. 
To see this, note that
Ut - U i t = ( l - e ) r
which shows tha t the difference is driven by the fact th a t when uninformed, 
the bureaucrat’s actions are be guided by the same group interest. For 
levels of competence close to 1  group membership loses its importance be­
cause state policy becomes increasingly objective. We believe tha t for all 
its simplicity, this mechanism could be im portant for the selection of bu­
reaucrats. The less informed government is, the more ideological will be its 
policy-making and the more possibility for conflict between bureaucrat and 
politician . 3 4
Under patronage, the politician chooses the bureaucrat, taking into ac­
count both the type and the investment e of the two candidates. One of the 
fascinating features of this way of recruiting personnel for the civil service is 
tha t types can work as a handicap. Under some circumstances this handicap 
is so im portant th a t candidates of the opposite type are not able to compete 
with candidates of the politician’s type.
L em m a 1 Recruitment under patronage ignores the investment i f  the loss 
caused by a mismatch in types is larger than the expected gain from more
34The advantage of modeling the effect through a group specific interest and not a prior 
is that the expectations of different actors with regard to policy benefits are consistent 
with each other.
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com petent policy making
A l : (1 -  eh) r  > i  (eh -  et) ( tt  -  r)
I f  A l  is fulfilled, the politician always chooses a bureaucrat of his own type.
Proof. The politician selects his own type even if she has the disadvantage 
of a low investment if
i(?r +  r) +  ^ (e*7r +  (1 -  ei)r) > +  i e/l(7r +  r)
Rewriting this condition leads to the condition in the lemma. ■
The condition in lemma 1 is easier to satisfy if r  is relatively high and 7r is 
relatively low. Hence, patronage ignores investments if political preferences 
are relatively im portant in government decisions.
It is im portant to note at this point tha t A l is crucial for some of our 
main results. If it does not hold, recruitment under patronage discriminates 
against non-matching types only in cases where investment by the two can­
didates is identical. We show below tha t meritocracy then looses part of 
its appeal for the incumbent. T hat said, note that A l  will always hold (for 
r  >  0 ) if — ei is small, i.e. there is always some degree of discrimination 
against non-matching types under patronage.
Under meritocracy the institution which recruits bureaucrats ignores 
their types. If one of the two candidates invested more, tha t person is 
chosen to become the bureaucrat. If both invested the same, each individual 
is chosen with a probability of Note th a t this commitment to recruit the 
most competent candidate prepares the ground for a very direct link between 
the investment decision and the probability of being recruited. Regardless
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of the investment decision of the other agent and the type of politician in 
power, high instead of low investment always increases the probability of 
becoming the bureaucrat by
1.4.4 P olitica l C om petition
Competition for the political office is modelled as an election by a subset 
of the population. In order to model the distribution of political power we 
assume tha t this subset can be biased. In particular, we assume tha t a share 
A of the electorate is left (t =  0) and a share 1 — A is right (t =  1). Hence, a 
left monopoly over political power is described by A =  1 while a more equal 
distribution of power leads to A < 1.
We assume tha t a share 1 — a  of the electorate always votes according 
to their type. A share a  only cares about the decision x  and votes if this 
improves their expected utility U (x ,m ,t) . This makes the decision of the 
share a  of votes endogenous to the bureaucratic system S .
If S  = patr, politicians control recruitment in period 1  and, hence, their 
type affects the expected value of U(x, m , £). It is then a dominant strategy 
for a voter of type t to vote for his type of politician because this implies a 
perfect match of interests . 3 5  The left incumbent then wins the struggle for 
power if
ctA “I- (1 — a)A -f- £ > a  (1 — A) -(- (1 — ct) (1 — A)
where e € [—1 , 1 ] is an uniformly distributed shock to the number of left
35The set-up here is related to the citizen-candidate models of political competition. 
However, the model always has two candidates. This excludes any incentive to vote 
strategically if voting is costless.
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votes. Re-writing this condition yields
£ > 1 - 2 X  
and the probability of re-election is
P p a tr  —
If S  = m erit on the other hand, recruitment is not in the hands of the 
politician and the voters who care only about x  are indifferent between the 
left and right politician. Given tha t individuals who care about x  abstain 
or randomize, the left incumbent wins if
(1 -  a)A + e > (1 — a) (1 — A)
and probability of re-election becomes
1 -  (1 -  2A) (1 -  a )
P?7icrit 2 *
A comparison of these two probabilities yields the following result.
Lem m a 2 Assume a > 0. Given that the incumbent’s group is powerful 
(A > ^) patronage leads to a higher probability o f re-election than meritoc­
racy. The opposite is true for  A < \ .
Proof. Note tha t
X 1 — (1 — 2A) (1 — a )
P p a tr  P m e r it  —  ^  ^
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the lemma follows immediately. ■
Lemma 2 describes the fact th a t patronage as a bureaucratic system 
can lead to a more radical political climate. A switch from meritocratic re­
cruitment to political recruitment increases the stakes connected to political 
leadership. Exactly by how much is determined by the parameter a.
A fascinating corollary from lemma 2 is tha t strong political resistance 
(A < ^) can be partly defused by moving decisions into the realm of meri­
tocratic recruitment.
1.4.5 In v e s tm e n t
We first analyze investment under patronage. Given A l,  the left candidate 
will become bureaucrat if and only if there is a left politician heading the 
executive. This makes the investment decision of the candidates highly 
dependant on Ppatr — A.
L em m a 3 Under patronage the left candidate invests if
A^ (eh -  ef) ( t r  -  t )  >  c  
and the right candidate invests i f
(1 - A ) i ( e h - e i ) ( 7 r - T )  > c  
Expected competence is maximized at a power monopoly (X 6  {0 ,1}).
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P ro o f. Note tha t there is no strategic interaction between the two candi­
dates under A l.  The left candidate invests if
A
> A
+  t )  +  ^ (e^7r +  (1 — eh)  t )
^(7r +  r) +  i ( e Z7r +  ( l - e z) r )
+  (1 — A) 
-I- (1 -  A)
1 1 ,-7r +  -e(7r +  T)
1  1  /-7T+ -e(7r +  r)
— c
where e denotes the investment of the right candidate. This condition can 
be rewritten to
(eh ~  ei) (tr -  r )  > c
The argument for the right candidate is analogous. Given these investment 
decisions and A l it follows tha t overall expected competence is maximized 
if we have either a left or a right power monopoly, A € {0,1}, as this leads 
to certain recruitment of a candidate with competence e — for all c < 
\ { e h - e i ) ( ^ - T ) .  ■
Patronage under A l  creates a labor market monopsony for candidates 
of the politician’s type. This kills competition for the post between types. 
W hat remains as an investment incentive is the internalized, expected gain 
from improved competence in decision-making. The left candidate for ex­
ample knows she will be recruited with probability A. Her expected gain in 
decision-making if she invests is \  (e^ — e\) (ir — t ) . The parameter r  enters 
negatively in this term because more information leads to less type moti­
vated decisions.
Competence is maximized under a power monopoly (A e  {0,1}) because 
the more competent candidate is hired with certainty in tha t situation. In a 
left power monopoly (A =  0) for example, the right candidate never invests 
while the propensity to invest is maximized for the left candidate. At the
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same time, the power monopoly ensures tha t a left politician is in power in 
the future which ensures that the left candidate is always hired.
Recruitment under meritocracy is independent of who is in power and, 
hence, the investment decision is symmetric between the two candidates. It 
can be summarized in a single investment probability, z.
L em m a 4 Denote the probability that a candidate invests under meritocracy 
by z E [0,1]. Meritocracy leads to full investment, z =  1, i f  c <  \  ( 1  - e h) r
otherwise.
P ro o f. See the appendix A.I. ■
Note tha t now the group-specific component r  affects the level of com­
petence positively. By investing, the candidate increases her probability of
two candidates compete for influence through their competence. Political 
polarization therefore has a positive effect on investment.
The comparison of expected competence under patronage and meri­
tocracy is complicated by the fact that investment depends on the dis­
tribution of power, A, under patronage but not under meritocracy. It 
is im portant to note, however, tha t meritocracy fares relatively well for 
high levels of investment costs. Investment does not drop to zero un­
less c >  5  (1 — e / J r  +  \{eh — e/)7r. Under patronage it does already at 
c — \  (eh ~  ^i) (n — t ) which is strictly smaller. Hence, meritocracy has a 
clear competence advantage if competence is costly.
and
z = max < 1
being hired and reduces the probability of the other type being hired - the
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1 .5  R e su lts
In this section we discuss under what conditions government introduces mer­
itocracy and why this choice is connected to political power. We then turn 
towards the welfare implications of our findings and show tha t they might 
contribute to a better understanding of the welfare effects of bureaucratic 
systems and the distribution political power.
1.5.1 T h e  R o le  o f P o litica l P ow er
Before we discuss our main results it will be useful to point out a main 
driving force behind the switch from patronage to meritocracy with falling 
political power A.
L em m a 5 Political power, X, ceteris paribus increases the expected value of 
U( x , m, t )  for the incumbent under patronage. The expected utility from x 
is not affected by X under meritocracy.
P ro o f. For a proof of the change under patronage see appendix A.2. We 
showed in the previous section that neither recruitment nor investment de­
pend on Pmerit and, hence, A under meritocracy. The second part of the 
lemma follows immediately. ■
Lemma 5 confirms tha t patronage makes the incumbent’s expected util­
ity dependant on the distribution of political power while meritocracy does 
no t . 3 6  This is not surprising given the explicit aim of meritocracy to de- 
politicize recruitment. But the simplicity of lemma 5 relies on the fact that 
the investment decisions described in lemma 3 is ignored. A comparison of
36 This qualitative statement is not changed with the inclusion of the expected rent for 
the left incumbent p  ■ R. Given lemma 2, the re-election probability p  is affected more 
by political power A under patronage than under meritocracy. This implies that loss of 
power affects the expected rent more under patronage than under meritocracy.
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meritocracy and patronage, however, has to include both the direct effect of 
political recruitment control on U{x, m, t) and the indirect effect through in­
vestments. We therefore need to  combine lemmas 3, 4 and 5. A visualization  
is offered in figures 3 and 4.
Expected Utility 
(Incumbent)
Figure 3: Incumbent’s Expected Utility from Patronage
Figure 3 depicts the expected value of U (x , m, t ) under patronage for 
the left incumbent. The four areas A to D are determined by the two 
investment lines given in lemma 3. In area A, both candidates invest. The 
triangular shape of that area is created by the fact that under a relatively 
equal distribution of power (A =  both candidates have the same incentive 
to invest into competence. It is therefore always the case the both candidates 
stop investing at the same level of investment cost c. The point at which 
both stop investing is clearly visible because the incumbent’s expected utility 
drops drastically at that point. In areas B  and C only one of the candidates 
invests. Area B,  for example describes a situation with high levels of left 
power, A, in which only the left candidate invests because the likelihood that
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she is hired is sufficiently high. The right candidate never invests for high 
A because her group has little access to political power and so she is rarely 
hired.
The first part of lemma 5 is a description of the slope in each of the areas 
A to D with respect to A. For a given level of competence, the incumbent 
benefits from a higher likelihood of a left bureaucrat. Under patronage this 
likelihood is exactly A.
I
Expected Utility 
(Incumbent)
Figure 4: Incumbent’s Expected Utility from Meritocracy
Figure 4 visualizes the incum bent’s expected value of U(x,m,  t) under 
meritocracy. As described in lemma 5, the expected value of U(x , m, t ) is 
independent of A in this case. Figure 4 reflects this de-politicisation through
Combining the insights in lemma 1 to 5 allows us to put down our first 
central result.
P ro p o s itio n  1  Given A l ,  the departure from a power monopoly (A =  1) 
makes meritocracy (weakly) more attractive for the incumbent.
P ro o f. The proposition follows immediately from lemmas 2 to 5. By lemma 
5 meritocracy always gains relatively from a decrease in A if competence does 
not change. By lemma 3 competence under patronage is maximized at A =  1 
and by lemma 4 competence under meritocracy is independent of A. Given 
a departure from A =  1, the expected value of U(x,  m , t ) is therefore weakly 
decreasing under patronage but constant under meritocracy. In addition, 
lemma 2 showed tha t the expected rent R  is more heavily affected by A under 
patronage. The proposition follows from combining these three factors. ■
Proposition 1  is a qualitative statement about disruptions in power mo­
nopolies. It states tha t governments will have more incentives to abandon 
patronage if they cease to have a monopoly on power. The reasons are 
threefold.
First, losing power under patronage always means loosing control over 
recruitment. Moving away from a left power monopoly (A =  1) therefore 
implies a higher likelihood tha t the right candidate is hired. The pure effect 
of control loss over recruitment can be best seen in area D . Any departure 
from a power monopoly always leads to a decrease in utility. Under meritoc­
racy on the other hand, recruitment is allocated to the neutral commission 
and is therefore independent of A.
Secondly, competence suffers from a departure of A =  1 under patronage 
but not under meritocracy. To see this note tha t by lemma 3 the right 
candidate never invests under patronage if A =  1 because she is never hired.
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If A decreases slightly, her investment decision does not change but she is 
hired with positive probability. The overall effect on expected utility can 
be seen in figure 3. Areas A  and B  converge for high A and lead to the 
same expected utility at A =  1 in the upper left corner. Under meritocracy, 
competence is independent of A and, hence, does not fall when A falls.
Thirdly, the scope for boosting the election likelihood with patronage de­
creases as political power decreases. While the introduction of meritocratic 
recruitment leads to a considerable loss of election likelihood in a power 
monopoly, this loss diminishes with falling power. This also diminishes the 
incentives of the incumbent to stick to  patronage for the sake of an increased 
expected ego-rent and meritocracy becomes relatively more attractive.
Proposition 1 leaves the question whether the left incumbent ever prefers 
to introduce meritocracy. The following proposition answers this question.
P ro p o s itio n  2 Assume A l .  For an equal distribution of political power 
(A =  ^) meritocracy weakly dominates. In addition, there is always an 
interval of investment costs c at which the incumbent introduces the merit 
system even when his group is powerful (i.e. for some A > ^).
P ro o f. See appendix A.3 for a proof and exact upper and lower bounds on 
c. m
Why is meritocracy dominant if political power is equally distributed? 
The three channels described above create the weak dominance. If political 
power is equally distributed, patronage does not offer a boost in the election 
likelihood at this level because it creates resistance and support to exactly 
equal amounts. Patronage therefore implies exactly the same likelihood of 
re-election as meritocracy. This implies tha t both the expected ego-rent 
and the amount of political control over recruitment are identical under
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both systems. This shifts the focus to competence.
Meritocracy dominates because it offers a weakly higher competence 
than patronage when power is shared (A =  ^). The underlying reason for 
this dominance is tha t from point of view of the candidates, the recruitment 
bias is exogenous under patronage. Candidates therefore do not increase 
their group specific rent, (1 — e)r, by investing. Under meritocracy candi­
dates know tha t if they do not invest, the other type will be chosen more 
likely. Meritocracy manages to motivate investment by channeling political 
conflict into the bureaucracy.
It is im portant to note tha t strict dominance of meritocracy at A =  \  
implies tha t there are values of A > ^ at which the left incumbent prefers 
the isolation of bureaucracy from politics. Intuitively this is because he 
is willing to exchange some informal power of like-minded bureaucrats for 
more competence. While the introduction of the merit system lowers the 
probability of a left bureaucrat from p  to \  it raises competence by giving 
the candidates an incentive to invest.
Figure 5 merges figures 3 and 4 and shows that meritocracy weakly dom­
inates for A =  | . 3 7  As can be seen in the graph, the competence advantage 
can be so im portant tha t meritocracy is preferred even under a left power 
monopoly. In all other cases a change from power monopoly to perfect 
political competition will lead to a switch from patronage to meritocracy.
A corollary of proposition 2 is tha t changes in investment costs, c, can 
create consensus in the introduction of the merit system. If investment costs 
are low, powerful groups are likely to oppose the introduction of meritoc­
3'Note that figure 5 ignores the expected ego-rent. If it is included, the incumbent is 
less inclined to switch to meritocracy if he is powerful. The difference of expected utility 
between the two system at A =   ^ remains unaltered, however, which implies that there 
will still be some c at which the incumbent prefers meritocracy even when he is powerful.
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racy because it implies a loss in control. A movement from low values of 
c to intermediate values can resolve this problem by making meritocracy 
universally beneficial. If high costs reflect a high degree of specialization in 
policy matters, complex modern states are more likely to cause high costs. 
Consensus in the introduction of the merit system  is then more likely in 
these states as the benefits from meritocracy are higher.
E xpected  Utility 
(Incum bent)
Figure 5: Dominance of Meritocracy under Shared Power
This also suggests an interesting comparative static with respect to r. As 
mentioned above, t  > ir implies that bureaucrats ignore their information 
and follow their types. In that situation, competence does not matter and 
meritocracy will only be chosen if A <  | . 38 If we interpret r  as the level of 
polarization this indicates that if society is very polarized meritocracy can 
never be introduced in consensus.
58 This is also why proposition 1 and 2 do not need AO.
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W hat happens as society becomes less polarized? The most im portant 
impact of a decreasing r  is tha t it diminishes the incentive of the politician 
to ignore investments under patronage. For low values of r ,  A l  can be 
violated and the politician recruits his own type only if both candidates 
are equally competent. We show in appendix A.4 that the choice between 
meritocracy and patronage is still affected by the expected control over 
recruitment. However, meritocracy looses its clear advantage in creating 
competence and, hence, cedes to dominate for A =  As r  goes to 0 the 
two recruitment systems are identical.
1.5.2 B ureaucratic System s and W elfare
Up to now we have focused on providing an explanation of the choices made 
by a government. But the framework also allows for an evaluation of this 
choice. As a benchmark, we first describe the maximum utilitarian welfare.
Assume th a t the number of individuals affected by decision x  is P . For 
simplicity, we assume tha t exactly half of the individuals in society are left 
(t = 0 ) so th a t regardless of the decision x  there is always a type-specific 
welfare of \ P t . U tilitarian welfare is then maximized if x = m  given that 
m  is known. This holds regardless of the relative size of 7r and r .
Given tha t investment is costly, it is always optimal tha t only one candi­
date invests and becomes bureaucrat. Investment of tha t candidate should 
be high if
(eh -  ei) P tt > c
and low otherwise. Hence, first-best investment is high if common interests 
are im portant (high 7r), many people are affected by the decision (high P) 
and if investment improves decision-making sufficiently (high — ei). As­
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sume tha t P  —> oo so tha t the bureaucratic system tha t maximizes expected 
competence is welfare maximizing - regardless of the investment costs it is 
causing. Our analysis of investment then yields the following result.
P roposition  3 Assume AO, A l  and P  —> oo . Meritocracy yields a (weakly) 
higher welfare for high and low investment costs and A 7  ^0,1. However, pa­
tronage strictly dominates for a combination of high concentrations of power 
and intermediate investment costs
(eh -  e/) (tt -  r )  >  c >  ( 1  -  eh) t
Proof. See appendix A.5. ■
The first part of proposition 3 could be regarded as the reason why mer­
itocratic recruitment is often seen as a factor in good governance - in most 
situations, meritocracy is welfare dominating patronage . 3 9  Perhaps the more 
intriguing finding in proposition 3 is tha t patronage can be more efficient 
than meritocracy if power is sufficiently concentrated. If the gains from bet­
ter policy-making are im portant, candidates under patronage invest with 
certainty a t low levels of c. This can even imply competence in situations 
where the likelihood of investment is less than one under meritocracy.
This finding stands in contrast to the common notion tha t patronage 
implies bureaucratic inefficiency. As the proposition shows, this assumption 
is only in place when power is shared in society.
'3JA large population, P  —* 00 , is important for generalizing this statement because 
meritocracy leads to a relatively large amount of waste in investments. These can only be 
justified if the population affected by the decision is large.
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1.5.3 P o litic a l P o w er a n d  W elfare
While the scope of this article is naturally limited through the focus on 
bureaucratic decisions, the framework allows for some interesting insights 
on the effects of power on welfare. We maintain the assumption tha t the 
population affected by the bureaucratic decision is large.
P ro p o s itio n  4 A monopoly of power for the incumbent is welfare maximiz­
ing as long as his preferred candidate invests into competence, i. e. i f  c < 
\  {e-h — e{) (n — t ). It (weakly) harms welfare fo r all c > \  (e^ — e/) (n — r )  
such that
[1 -  (1 -  z)2] (eh -  e{) it <  (1 -  e{) t +  i a R
because the incumbent does not introduce meritocracy despite incompetence 
in government.
P ro o f. The proof is presented in appendix A.6 . ■
Proposition 4 describes a link between political power, bureaucratic sys­
tems and welfare outcomes. According to  the proposition, high concentra­
tions of power can be good for welfare if bureaucratic competence is rela­
tively cheap and can be reached within patronage. As bureaucrats have to 
invest more to become effective, however, a power monopoly can fail to make 
the switch to meritocracy. The condition in the proposition shows tha t this 
is the case for high values of \o tR  and low values of 7r.
The term \otR  measures the personal political benefits of the politician 
from patronage. If the share of voters motivated through decision x  is large 
(large a) the incumbent will face a considerable loss in the likelihood of 
being elected when he switches to meritocracy. If the personal rents from 
power, R , are high this loss of re-election probability can be an im portant
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reason to keep patronage in place, despite the costs of incompetence.
Common interest, 7r, on the other hand always improves the performance 
of power monopolies because it leads to less aversion to meritocracy. The 
reason is tha t with more benefits from matching policy to  the state of the 
world, the incumbent is more inclined to trade improved competence for the 
loss of control over recruitment.
The role of polarization, r ,  in proposition 4 is ambiguous. On the one 
hand it prevents the incumbent to switch to  meritocracy because it implies 
less control over who is recruited. On the other hand it improves investment 
under meritocracy and, hence, makes it more attractive for the incumbent. 
The real-world implication is tha t conflict harms welfare if and only if it 
prevents a switch to meritocratic recruitment.
A visualization of the condition in proposition 4 (for R  = 0) is provided 
by the upper brim, A =  1, of figure 5. For low levels of c, patronage leads 
to high levels of competence and dominates meritocracy clearly - the choice 
of the incumbent is in line with welfare maximization. As investment costs 
increase, competence under patronage drops to zero and the incumbent is 
willing to switch to meritocracy because he values its competence advantage 
sufficiently. This advantage shrinks, however, as investment costs increase 
further and patronage is again chosen despite the fact tha t it leads to welfare 
losses. The condition in proposition 4 is then satisfied.
Finally, the framework allows us to analyze the welfare effects caused 
by departures from a power monopoly. Such an analysis is im portant as it 
could capture some elements of the complex effects of political liberalization.
P ro p o s itio n  5 Transition from a power monopoly, A € {0,1}, to an equal 
distribution o f power, A =  leads to a slight decrease of welfare fo r  low
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investment costs and an increase for high investment costs. A partial sharing 
of power, A G Q , l ) ,  can only improve welfare i f  it leads to an abandonment 
of patronage.
P ro o f. The first part of the proposition follows from propositions 2 and 
4. According to proposition 2 the incumbent weakly prefers meritocracy 
for A =  \ .  Assuming tha t he introduces it, we know tha t investment costs 
increase compared to the situation where only the left candidate invests and 
is recruited. This implies a slight welfare loss as competence remains the 
same. For investment costs c > ^ (e^ — e{) (n — t )  the incumbent either 
introduces meritocracy at A =  1 or sticks to patronage. If he sticks to 
patronage at A =  1, the change to A =  \  and, hence, meritocracy is (weakly) 
welfare increasing. The second part of the proposition follows from the fact 
tha t values of A G ( 5 , 1 ) do not always lead to a change to  meritocracy but 
weakly reduce welfare from patronage. ■
The last part of proposition 5 can be understood as a warning about 
partial political reform. If changes in the political system take place to the 
background of high personal rents (ctR), for example, they can be detrimen­
tal to welfare because they harm the performance of patronage but do not 
imply a switch to meritocracy.
1.6  D iscu ss io n
The reasons for the change from patronage to merit system are numerous. 
In an attem pt to explain the choice, this paper conceptualizes these two 
systems as different ways of recruiting and promoting bureaucrats. One of 
the important advantages of patronage in this context is tha t it guarantees 
politically homogenous governments in situations where political loyalty is
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im portant. Meritocratic recruitment and promotion can be interpreted as 
a commitment to ignore loyalty considerations. We have shown tha t this 
commitment can improve competence compared to patronage by channeling 
political competition into the bureaucracy.
The main aim of our theoretical framework is to provide insights into how 
the distribution of political power affects the choice between meritocracy and 
patronage. We have shown tha t the decline of political power will typically 
increase the attractiveness of meritocracy. This holds despite the fact tha t a 
share of the population is more motivated to support the government under 
patronage. The reason is tha t governments can only increase their support 
through patronage as long as they control recruitment in the future. If 
the two groups competing for the seat in government are equally powerful, 
patronage only increases the stakes without giving one group and advantage 
over the other.
A surprising corollary from this finding is tha t political liberalization and 
meritocracy can be substitutes - weak governments can decrease political 
pressure for political change by introducing meritocracy. This factor could 
be important. One historic example tha t could be explained along these 
lines is that the Prussian government resisted strong pressures for political 
liberalization in the 19th century while at the same time introducing rules of 
recruitment and promotion tha t improved the access to power for the rising 
bourgeoisie. 4 0
But the fact tha t meritocracy lowers the stake of political competition 
could also have implications in a very different setting. We would expect 
less motivated participation in political struggles if more decisions are allo­
40 One sign of this access is that young men were able to marry noble women once they 
rose inside the state bureaucracy. For a more detailed discussion see Haas (2004).
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cated to meritocratically recruited personnel. Low voter participation, for 
example, could then be interpreted as a side-effect of the increased use of 
expert opinions in policy-making.
We identify the cost of competence as a key determinant of the choice 
between meritocracy and patronage. If costs are sufficiently low, patronage 
is favored by a powerful government and consensus on abolition is impossible. 
An increase in costs in our model could be interpreted as an increased need 
to acquire specialized knowledge for policy-making. As the need for expert 
knowledge increases, meritocracy becomes more attractive.
This could explain two sorts of variation. First, it might explain why 
some government bodies recruit by merit while others recruit by patronage. 
Central banks or the military, for example, might recruit by merit because 
officials in these areas have to acquire a relatively specific expertise to be­
come effective. Secondly, the link between high costs and meritocracy can 
explain why the civil service often coincides with modern centralized states. 
The early adoption of relatively meritocratic promotion and use state exam­
inations in China and Prussia, for example, could be explained along these 
lines.
It should be stressed that despite being highly simplified, our framework 
is able to capture the gist of a much richer model in which bureaucrats choose 
from a large variety of policy choices and can specialize either in being well- 
informed about the policy tha t maximizes group-specific rents or in being 
well-informed about the policy tha t maximizes overall economic growth. 
T hat kind of model would yield similar results as long as information on 
the growth maximizing policy is harder to acquire than information on rent 
maximization. Recent empirical work by Iyer and Mani (2007) on senior civil 
servants in India lends some support to  the impression tha t actual choices
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of bureaucrats reflect this specialization in expertise or loyalty. 41
Throughout this article, we have modelled bureaucratic systems as po­
litical state variables tha t cannot be altered easily. While this is likely 
realistic for a switch from patronage to meritocracy, it is less obvious why 
politicians will not recruit loyal types despite the existence of meritocratic 
institutions like a civil service commission and state exams. There are two 
reasons. First, meritocratic institutions typically increase transparency of 
the recruiting process and independent commissions will resist a decline of 
their power. Secondly, the increase in competence linked to meritocracy 
creates a larger ex ante consensus between different groups in society to 
maintain the institutions. While this consensus is not important in the one 
period model presented here, it can be of crucial importance for maintaining 
cooperation in a dynamic game.
Our analysis of the welfare effects, links this paper to the broader liter­
ature on the role of institutions in promoting growth. We have shown tha t 
meritocratic systems are, generally speaking, good institutions. However, a 
government’s choice of bureaucratic structure will be biased if common inter­
ests in society are weak and the private benefits from maintaining patronage 
are important. An additional implication of our analysis is tha t these mech­
anisms work through the extent to which the government decision is biased 
against meritocratic recruitment. This distinction is particularly interest­
ing for polarization as our findings imply tha t it will be associated with 
good outcomes if meritocratic recruitment can be maintained but with bad 
outcomes if patronage prevails.
W ithin its theoretical restrictions, this article also aims to contribute to
41 Their empiricical analysis of career paths reveals that political change indeed affects 
bureaucrats less when they are specialized in expertize.
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the broader discussion of the role of political institutions in creating good 
governance . 4 2  Effective governance in the basic framework presented here 
can be reached in two ways. For low costs of specialization, competent 
governance can be achieved by a combination of power monopoly and pa­
tronage. A diffusion of political power can only harm competence in this set­
ting. If bureaucratic decision-making requires a more specialized knowledge, 
however, government competence will typically only be reached if power is 
perfectly shared. The underlying reasons for the failure of power monopo­
lies in this setting is tha t group-specific interests and high personal rents in 
government prevent bureaucratic reforms tha t would improve competence.
42 See for example Besley and Kudamatsu (2007), Rodrik and Wacziarg (2005), and 
Przeworski and Limongi (1993) for a summary of earlier literature.
Table 1: The History of State Exams in Selected Western European Countries
United Kingdom 1832 first reform act - middle c la s s e s  gained  the right to vote
1853
N orthcote-Trevelyan report - explicitly s ta te s  that volatility of m inisters is a problem  for governm ent, the docu m ent s ta te s  the  
n eed  for a perm anent bureaucracy to guarantee com p eten ce
1855 Civil S erv ice  C om m ission  is created
1867 se co n d  reform act - working c la ss  m en gained  the right to vote
1870 Britain introduces open  com petitive entry exam s
Spain 1868 first revolution, so o n  followed by the declaration of a first republic
1 8 7 5 -1 9 1 7
Spain rem ains divided and governm ents rotate quickly, argum ents em erg e  that the sp o ils  sy stem  p la ce s  job security at risk in 
this context, instability prevents major reforms
1918 Estatuto d e Funcionarios introduces sta te  exam inations and job security for civil servan ts
1 9 2 3 -1 9 7 5 d esp ite  the legislation, recruiting rules are reversed , particularly under the Franco regim e 1 9 3 8 -1 9 7 5
Belgium 1918 Declaration of universal suffrage by the King, first election  en d s  catholic d om in ance of Belgian politics
1937 Cam u statute introduces sta te exam ination and promotion b a sed  on merit for higher g ra d es
France 1789 French Revolution, developm en t of a principal o f equal a c c e s s  to civil serv ice  positions
1799 N apoleon  crow ned first consul
1850+ se lec tiv e  introduction of com petitive entry procedures
1871 third Republic, end  of m onarchy in France
1871 + generalisation  of sta te  exam inations
Sources: Hondeghem (2000) for Belgium, Meininger (2000) for France and Parrado-Diez (2000) for Spain. Britain se e  previous section 2.1.
Table 2: Recruitment through State Exams and Political Competitiveness
U se  of S ta te  Exam s U se  of S tate Exam s U se  o f S ta te  E xam s U se  of S ta te  E xam s
Political Competition 0.55***(3.02) - - 0 .47**(2.34)
Selection - -1.08***(-3.32) - -
Election - - 0.83**(2.25) -
Legal Origin UK - - - 0 .3 (0 .6 4 )
Ethnic Fragm entation - - - 0 .9 4 (1 .3 7 )
GDP per capita - - - 0 .0 1 (1 .0 )
n
adj. R-squared
28
0 .23
28
0.27
28
0 .1 3
28
0 .29
Use of State Exam s m easures the share o f senior bureaucrats recruited through state exams. Political Competition m easures competitive entry into the executive for politicians. Standard OLS 
regressions, t-statistics in paranthesis, * Significant at 10%, ** Significant at 5%, *** Significant at 1%
Sources: Use of State Exams from Rauch and Evans; Political Competition, Selection and Election from PolityIV; GDP p er capita (in thousand US $) from Wolrd Economic Outlook 2007; Legal Origin 
UK from LaPorta e t al (1999); Ethnic Fragmentation from Easterly and Levine (1997).
2 Not-for-profits and Incentives for M otivated A gents
(Joint with Maitreesh Ghatak)
2 .1  In tr o d u c tio n
Not-for-profit organizations are an im portant part of most economies. In the 
United States, for example, there were about 1.4 million nonprofit organi­
zations registered in 200643 and the sector contributed about 5.2 percent of 
GDP in 2004.44 A defining characteristic of not-for-profit firms is tha t they 
are private but explicitly meant to further broad public interest. A ttracted 
by this goal, considerable amounts of volunteering work is provided in not- 
for-profit organizations - about half of the 14 million full-time employees in 
the US not-for-profit sector work on voluntary basis.
The key feature tha t distinguishes not-for-profit firms from for-profits is 
the fact tha t those who exercise control in a not-for-profit are not allowed to 
capture the financial return of production. Why is an organizational form 
chosen that diminishes financial incentives? There are several answers tha t 
focus on what Hansmann (1980) calls contractual failure.45 A particular 
mechanism tha t links the existence of not-for-profits, their focus on mission 
oriented activities, and their ability to a ttract voluntary labour contributions 
is Francois (2000). Francois shows tha t the financial motivation for the 
manager in the for-profit can crowd-out output related intrinsic motivation 
of the worker. The reduction of financial incentives in a not-for-profit can
43Internal Revenue Service Data Book 2006, these include public charities, private foun­
dations, and religious congregations.
44Thomas Pollack and Amy Blackwood, “The Nonprofit Sector in Brief: Facts and 
Figures from the Nonprofit Almanac 2007”
43See for example Easly and O’Hara (1983), Glaeser and Shleifer (2001) or Francois 
(2003).
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then motivate the worker and allows for a reduction of wage payments.
In this article we present a simple model of moral hazard tha t captures 
this basic idea. The owner of a firm hires a worker who benefits intrinsically 
from the provision of a particular output (health, poverty reduction, etc.) 
but receives this non-pecuniary benefit regardless of his own efforts. This 
implies th a t the intrinsic motivation of the worker can only be translated 
into lower wages if the worker is left alone in the process. Put differently, if 
the worker has the feeling tha t output would be provided regardless of his 
efforts, he has to be paid a higher financial incentive to exert effort. If the 
owner of the firm can commit not to interfere with production, the workers 
knows output will fully reflect his actions and he is easier to motivate.
Our main goal is to endogenize organizational choice in this context. In 
particular, we analyze the motives of an individual controlling the organi­
zation (the manager) 4 6  and an individual hired in the labor market to work 
in the organization (the worker). An analysis of the worker and manager 
matching and endogenous organizational choice is im portant for empirical 
research as it might help our understanding of worker characteristics and 
wages in the for- and not-for-profit sector . 4 7
First, we show tha t not-for-profits are only created because they are 
able to induce manager commitment and therefore worker effort at low wage 
costs. In our model, this implies tha t not-for-profit firms provide a low level 
of overall effort at low wage costs while for-profit firms provide high effort at 
high wage costs. As soon as the manager benefits sufficiently from project 
success, either for financial or for intrinsic reasons, he is willing to trade
46 One can show that in Francois (2000) the manager himself is worse off under govern­
ment ownership.
47See, for example, Leete (2001) or Mocan and Tekin (2003) for a discussion.
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higher wage costs for higher levels of effort. The not-for-profit is therefore 
chosen in sectors tha t offer low profit margins and by managers who are 
intrinsically not very motivated.
The last finding stands in contrast to the usual intuition tha t more in­
trinsically motivated managers will create not-for-profit firms. But in the 
case of this model4 8  the contractual failure, unobservable worker effort, is 
not affecting the relationship between consumer/patron and manager but 
between worker and manager. Therefore, the not-for-profit firm is the solu­
tion to a conflict between manager and worker and not society and manager. 
This implies tha t the not-for-profit organizational form is chosen for different 
reasons than usually assumed.
This conceptual point is further reinforced by looking at worker self­
selection. We show tha t if workers can choose freely whether they want 
to work in a for-profit or a not-for-profit firm they will always choose a 
for-profit. The reason is th a t workers earn lower wages and receive lower 
expected intrinsic benefits (since the manager does not supply effort) in 
the not-for-profit. To attract workers, not-for-profits would have to pay a 
higher wage and thereby loose their attractiveness as an organizational form 
for the manager. We show tha t with endogenous matching, not-for-profits 
do not arise if motivated workers are relatively scarce. Or, put differently, 
oversupply of intrinsically motivated labor is a necessary condition for the 
survival of not-for-profit firms.
Hence, the model suggests a rather pessimistic view on the link between 
not-for-profits and intrinsic motivation. Not-for-profits arise, not because 
motivated workers like to  work in tha t organizational environment but be­
cause there is a surplus of motivated labor in these sectors. While the
48 And similarly in the well-cited model presented in Francois (2000).
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for-profit is the institutional set-up tha t achieves the first best, it is not cho­
sen by unmotivated managers who have market power. Our model suggests 
tha t if the management side was really motivated to change the world they 
would create for-profits. While this might not be realistic in general, it pro­
vides a theory for social entrepreneurship or the fourth sector4 9  in areas in 
which contractual failure is not affecting the relationship between consumer 
and producer.
The plan of the paper is as follows. In the following section we discuss 
related literature. Section 2.3 presents the basic framework of our model. It 
captures the mechanism provided by Francois (2000) but proposes a stan­
dard contracting framework where incentive pay is possible. In section 2.4, 
we discuss the incentives of the manager to select the not-for-profit firm. Sec­
tion 2.5 presents the incentives of the worker and briefly discusses optimal 
organizational choice under endogenous matching. Section 2.6 concludes.
2 .2  R e la te d  L itera tu re
At the very core of economics lies the notion tha t financial incentives are a 
powerful motor in the creation of economic welfare. This insight goes back 
to Adam Smith who wrote with regard to entrepreneurs:
It is the stock [capital] that is employed for the sake of profit, which 
puts into motion the greater part o f the useful labour of every society. The 
plans and projects of the employers of stock regulate and direct all the most 
important operations of labour, and profit is the end proposed by all those 
plans and projects . 5 0
But as pointed out by Hansmann (1980), it is exactly this motive that
49 See Bornstein (2004).
50Smith (2001), p. 347.
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is restricted in the not-for-profit sector. An institutional nondistribution 
constraint restricts the financial benefit to those controlling the firm because 
it does not allow net earning to be dispersed amongst the owners. Clearly 
the economic importance of the not-for-profit stands in a conflict to the 
general belief of the usefulness of the profit motive as expressed by Smith. 
It is this fundamental contradiction tha t is at the core of a large part of the 
literature on not-for-profits.
Hansmann argued tha t an understanding of not-for-profits must come 
from the assumptions made in the classic economic framework. If these 
are not satisfied, not-for-profits can be welfare enhancing. In particular, he 
stresses the inability of consumers or patrons to police producers by ordinary 
contractual devices, which he calls contract failure.
An early formal model of contract failure as a motivation for not-for- 
profits is provided by Easly and O ’Hara (1983). They model a society tha t 
is interested in maximizing welfare. The basic conflict in their framework is 
between the manager of a firm and consumers of firm output. They show 
tha t when output cannot be observed by society then managers have the 
incentive to raise their own utility and delivering less to the consumers. The 
nondistribution constraint works as a simple constraint to this behavior and 
can therefore increase welfare. Their model does not deal with self-selection 
of managers into organizational forms. The only constraint society has to 
take into account when offering the manager a contract is his participation 
constraint.
This conceptual problem is avoided in a more recent contribution of Ed­
ward Glaeser and Andrei Shleifer. They model the incentives of a manager 
who chooses between a for- and not-for-profit setting. Their analysis re­
lies on the contractual problems in a multi-tasking environment pointed out
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by Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991). Motivating an agent on a contractible 
task (effort in providing output) might lead to  undesirable outcomes because 
another non-contractible task (effort in quality) is neglected. Glaeser and 
Shleifer (2001) apply this idea to argue tha t profit incentives might lead to 
undesirable outcomes from the point of view of donors who value the non- 
contractible outcome of the firm. It is then possible tha t not-for-profits at­
tract donations because their soft incentive protects donor’s interests. It can 
be shown in this context tha t not-for-profits remain attractive for managers 
because the reduced financial incentive in the not-for-profit is compensated 
by the increase in donations.
Francois (2000) develops a similar idea linked to the intrinsic motivation 
of workers. He shows tha t when workers receive intrinsic motivation from 
the provision of an output, the firm faces a public good problem. If the 
manager is very motivated to provide the output, he needs to pay the worker 
a higher wage to motivate effort because the worker knows tha t provision is 
likely even if he shirks. Francois argues tha t this is the reason why the 
reduced financial incentives in the for-profit firm can be attractive to a 
social planner. We show here tha t his welfare argument relies on relatively 
specific assumptions. In particular, it can be shown tha t the social planners 
sentiment is not shared by the manager or worker. The underlying reason 
is that Francois does not model a contract failure in the sense of Hansmann 
(1980). From the consumer’s perspective the choice between not-for-profit 
and for-profit is irrelevant as it only entails different allocations of welfare 
inside the firm. This finding does not reveal itself in Francois (2000) because 
worker and manager self-selection are not explicitly dealt with.
The empirical relevance of worker self-selection is a known problem in
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the literature on not-for-profit wages. 51 A recent demonstration of the im­
portance has been provided by Mocan and Tekin (2003). They show th a t 
workers earn a rent in the child-care sector once worker self-selection is con­
trolled for. However, they also show tha t this rent does not necessarily imply 
the absence of labor donations.
While the effect of competition in output markets on the sectorial mix 
has been discussed in the theoretical literature on not-for-profits5 2  the effect 
of competition for workers on organizational choice remains unexplored . 5 3  
A related paper in this respect is Besley and Ghatak (2005). In their 
model, mission oriented managers and workers have an interest to match 
with each other because this implies higher output inside the match. How­
ever, their work does not discuss the role of the nondistribution constraint 
in this context. The benefits from motivated agents depend entirely on the 
worker/manager match but are independent of the organizational form.
2 .3  T h e  M o d e l
Before we start with the formal analysis of the not-for-profit it is useful to set 
the scene of the model. Consider firms in the development or health industry. 
Firms in these industries often receive contracts from larger organizations, 
like for example the World Bank or medicare in the US, th a t offer a fixed 
financial benefit for the completion of a project or provision of a health 
service. Regardless of the organizational form, firms typically process some 
hierarchical structure in which errors at the lower level of the firm can be
51 See for example Preston (1989) for a discussion.
52See for example Lakdawalla and Philipson (2006).
53 See for example Francois (2003) orRowat and Seabright (2006) who develop arguments 
around the lower wage in the not-for-profit sector but do not discuss competition for 
workers.
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compensated by the owner/manager. This implies tha t not only worker 
effort matters for output but also the motivation of the management to 
compensate mistakes, either by providing labor input themselves or by hiring 
additional other inputs. The model presented in this section abstracts from 
the exact mechanism by which the management can compensate for worker 
failure and simply models the problem as a sequential provision of costly 
effort.
2.3.1 Production  Technology
We model a production process in which the worker and the manager exert 
costly effort. The worker moves first and produces a first stage output, 
yi G {0,1} . This intermediate output is observed by the manager who then 
decides on his effort. His effort determines the second stage output, y<i G 
{0,1}. The production technology is as follows:
•  The worker exerts effort, e\y G {1 , 0 }.
— If effort ew  =  1 then Prob{y\ = 1) =  h
— If effort ew  =  0 then Prob(yi = 1) =  I = 0
• Output, yi G {1,0}, is realized and observed
— After observing yi, the manager may exerts effort, em  G {1,0} .
•  If i/i =  1 then j/2  — 0 for any G {1,0}
• If y\ = 0 then ?/2 £ {0,1}
— If effort ejv/ =  1  then Prob(y2 =  l|y i =  0) =  h
— If effort eM = 0 then Prob(y =  l|y i =  0) =  I = 0
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This technology captures a situation in which the firm has to  provide 
a target level of standardized output or project success. If the target of 
production is fulfilled, additional effort will have no positive effect on output.
O utput yields financial returns of 7r. In addition, we assume tha t man­
ager and worker are intrinsically motivated. In particular, we assume that 
the output of the project (or equivalently, the fact that the target level of 
output was reached) is a pure public good to the worker and the manager. 54  
They receive a benefit of 6j (j  — W, M ) from project success independently 
of their own effort and the organizational form of the firm.
The cost of effort to the worker and the manager are c(e\y) = ew  and 
c(eA/) — eM- Both types of effort are unobservable. This is a particular 
variety of the problem of moral hazard in teams, one in which the sequential 
nature of the effort decisions is important. Note tha t we assumed that the 
manager has the same effort costs as the worker. This assumption is only 
made for simplification. The basic mechanisms pointed out here would also 
hold if the manager had a higher effort cost than the worker. 5 5
We also assume limited liability on the part of the worker, as is standard 
in this class of incentive problems: the worker’s wage cannot be negative. 
In addition, we assume limited liability on the side of the manager: wages 
can not exceed the existing financial benefits 7r. The latter assumption is 
made for simplicity and does not drive our main results.
54 To be more specific, benefits are a club good that only affects individuals involved in 
production.
55 This assumption is made in Francois (2000, 2003).
66
2.3 .2  T he M anager’s Problem
Before production starts, the manager maximizes his expected utility by 
choosing the organizational form and the wage paid to the worker. Due to  
the fact tha t there are two stages, he has the option of paying two different 
wages contingent on first and second stage success, w\ and w2.
In addition, the manager chooses whether to run a for-profit or not- 
for-profit firm. A not-for-profit firm is characterized by the fact that the 
manager cannot keep all the profit. Denote the share of profits kept by the 
manager by a. Here we follow the formulation of Glaeser and Shleifer (2001) 
of the non distribution constraint. In particular, assume tha t committing 
to non distribution means tha t the manager can still capture some of the 
profits, but the technology of doing so entails some losses (e.g., perks) . 5 6
In our analysis a  is a choice variable of the manager. While this might 
not be realistic, the assumption should be regarded a modelling device th a t 
simplifies the discussion of comparative statics significantly. We will speak 
of a not-for-profit firm (NP) if a  < 1 and a for-profit firm (FP) if a  = l . 5 7
The managers problem before the game can then be described by
max EU{ew,e*M) =
a,w i,u>2
Pr(yi =  1  | ejy) [a(ir -  wi) +  0M\
+  Pr(?/i =  0 | e ^ )  [P rfe  =  1 | e*M) {a(ir -  w2) +  6M} ~ e*M]
subject to the manager and worker incentive compatibility constraints (dis­
56 See also Hansmann (1980), pp. 873-875 for some support of this possibility.
J' Alternatively, the not-for-profit could be defined by a  =  0. We discuss this alternative 
in appendix B.2 and show that the not-for-profit can never dominate in this case.
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cussed below) and worker and manager limited liability constraints. The 
latter prevent payments of w > 7r and w  <  0. Optimal worker effort, e ^ ,  is 
a function of w , 9w  and eM and optimal manager effort, e*M , is a function 
of a , w  and 9m -
2.3.3 The F irst B est Solution
The first best outcome maximizes total surplus. For the second stage this 
implies that the manager should exert effort (eM = 1 ) if yi = 0  and
h( 7T +  9\y +  9m ) — 1 >  0 
and eM = 0 otherwise. At stage 1  the worker should exert effort (ew = 1)
if
h(ir +  9w + 9m) — 1 +  (1 — h) {h(n +  9w +  9m) — 1} h(ir +  9w +  9m) — 1 
or
h(n +  9w  +  9m ) — 1 ^ 0
and ew = 0  otherwise.
An im portant difference from our model to Francois (2000) is tha t project 
failure is possible even when worker effort is high. This creates benefits from 
high manager effort in situation in which the worker does not shirk . 58
58 The difference depends on the success rate from effort, h.  For h  =  1 our model is 
similar to Francois (2000) set up - in equilibrium either manager or worker exert effort 
but never both.
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In summary, the first best effort level is given by
1  i f  h(ir +  6\y  +  &m ) — 1  >  0
0 i f  h(ir + 0\v 0m) — 1 < 0
1  i f  h(n  +  Ow +  #m) — 1  >  0  D yi = 0
0 otherwise
to avoid trivial solutions, we assume that
j40 : h{7T 4- 0\\r -f- 0m) — 1 > 0
and so the first-best has e^P  =  1  and e ^ f  = 1  if y\ = 0 .
2.3 .4  T he Incentive C onstraints
We start by analyzing the managers incentive to exert effort in the second 
stage. If the worker was successful, the manager has no incentive to exert 
effort as effort is costly but has no impact on output. If the worker was not 
successful, the manager exerts effort if
where 0m is manager intrinsic motivation, 7r is the financial benefit from 
project success and W2 is the wage paid to the worker.
Naturally, if h- 0m > 1 , the manager will exert effort independent of W2 
and a  (since by the limited liability assumption a  cannot be negative or w 
cannot exceed 7r), and similarly, if h(0M +  7r) < 1 the manager will never 
exert effort. We therefore make the following assumption
h ( 0 M  + a t ( i r  —  W 2 ) )  >  1 ( i)
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1 1A l : -  -  it < 6m  < t - h, h
which ensures tha t the commitment problem exists and can be solved through 
a reduction of financial incentives.
While this seems like a trivial point, it is im portant to note tha t the 
manager is not over-motivated to exert effort in comparison to the first best 
rule. To see this, note tha t 4^1 implies AO - if the manager regards the 
project worth saving it must be true tha t his effort increases overall welfare.
There are two possible scenarios for the incentive constraints of the 
worker depending on whether equation (1) is satisfied or violated. If it 
is satisfied, the manager exerts effort in the second stage. The worker then 
foresees th a t the manager will provide effort if she fails. She exerts effort if
h(9\y +  uii) +  (1 — h) h{9w  +  w2) — 1 > h($w  +  w2)
where the second term on the left-hand side describes the worker’s expected 
utility from failure. Rewriting this condition yields
h(6w  +  w\) — h?(9w  +  W2 ) >  1 . (2 )
If equation (1) is violated, the manager is committed to never exert 
effort. The worker knows tha t there will be no chance of project success if 
she does not succeed. She then exerts effort if
h(9w + wi)  ^  1- (3)
By comparison of these two equations (and given that by the limited
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liability assumption W2 > 0 ) it should be clear tha t the worker is more 
motivated if she knows the manager will not exert effort. The term h2(0w  +  
W2 ) in equation (2 ) captures the fact tha t the worker receives both the wage 
payment W2 and her intrinsic benefit 6\y with probability h , even if she did 
not succeed in providing project success in the first stage.
Note tha t the wage payment W2 reduces the payoff for the manager and 
has a negative impact on worker incentives. The only time it will be used is 
therefore to commit the manager to no effort.
2 .4  M a n a g er  O rg a n iza tio n a l C h o ice
In this section we discuss the organizational choice of the manager for a 
given manager-worker match. We first show tha t the ability to commit the 
manager to low effort is crucial for the manager’s organizational choice.
2.4.1 T h e  R o le  o f C o m m itm en t
P ro p o s itio n  6  I f  w < ir the not-for-profit will only be chosen by the man­
ager i f  it commits him to no effort.
P ro o f. Note first tha t if w <  7r, a  reduces the profit retained by the manager 
and therefore the incentive to exert effort. If there are no positive effects on 
worker incentives, reducing a  is never optimal. However, as shown in the 
previous section, reducing a  can be used to commit the manager to no effort 
and change the worker IC constraint. This is the only potentially positive 
effect of the reduction of a  and,hence, the not-for-profit form. ■
Note tha t proposition 6  implies tha t 41  is a necessary condition for not- 
for-profit dominance. If 41  is not satisfied either there is no commitment 
problem and the for-profit is always preferred, or the not-for-profit cannot
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solve the commitment problem and, hence, can never dominate the for- 
profit. However, assumption A1 implies AO. In other words, the not-for- 
profit setting is only chosen by the manager in cases in which it moves the 
overall outcome away from first best effort provision.
Another corollary from proposition 6  is tha t a variation in the production 
function can make not-for-profit dominance impossible. To see this, note 
th a t a constant returns production function would imply that the managers 
IC constraint is independent of y\. Worker and manager effort choices are 
independent in tha t case. But if they are independent then manager com­
mitment has no effect on the worker’s IC constraint and the not-for-profit 
can never dominate.
Proposition 6  makes clear tha t the only advantage of a reduction in a  
is the change of the incentive constraint of the worker. A brief look at 
the manager’s IC constraint reveals, however, th a t a reduction of financial 
incentives through a  is not the only way to  commit. In fact, one can show 
tha t the manager will typically find a second stage wage payment, ^ 2  > 0 , 
more attractive . 5 9
In our analysis, we therefore focus on the case in which the manager can 
only pay a wage contingent on intermediate output, i.e. we assume W2 — 
O. 6 0  This relates our contractual assumptions to those made by Francois 
(2000). He assumes tha t output is not contractible and tha t the manager 
pays an efficiency wage to the worker. While conceptually quite different, 
the incentive effect of an efficiency wage and a wage payment contingent on
59 We show this in appendix B .l.
60A way to understand this contractual environment is to assume that the manager 
sub-contracts the project to the worker and agrees on a bonus payment contingent on the 
fulfillment of that contract. If the worker fails, the contract ends and the manager can 
exert effort or let the project fail. In this setting verifyability is likely linked to ’project 
ownership’.
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intermediary output are similar.
2.4 .2  O ptim al W ages and Profit Share
W ith u>2 = 0, the IC of the manager in the second stage becomes
h (a7r +  9m ) >  1
and given A l,  commitment to no effort is only possible in the not-for-profit 
firm. The manager receives the maximum payoff when committing if he 
chooses a  such tha t this condition is just satisfied with equality. The optimal 
a  is therefore given by
7r
where a* < 1 exists by >1 1 .
The purpose of reducing the residual claimancy is the commitment of 
the manager to no effort. Given tha t the manager committed, the worker’s 
incentive compatibility constraint is
h (wjyp +  0w) > 1  
and the optimal wage payment in the not-for-profit is
w n p  =  t  ~  9 w -  h
In the for-profit firm the manager cannot commit not to exert effort. 
Absence of commitment means tha t the worker knows tha t if she fails to 
provide effort, there is still a probability of h th a t the project succeeds. Her 
incentive compatibility constraint is therefore modified to
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h (wjrp +  ( 1  — h)6w) 1
and the resulting wage payment needed to make the worker exert effort is
wpp — ^  -  (1 -  h)9w
As h < 1, it is clear upon inspection tha t wpp  >  w n p - The crucial 
difference between for and not-for-profit wages is that intrinsic motivation 
reduces the needed wage payment less in the for-profit. This wage difference 
to the not-for-profit is driven by our assumption on output related intrinsic 
motivation. The worker knows that, should she fail, she will still receive Qw 
with probability h because the manager exerts effort by A l.
This crowding-out of worker intrinsic motivation is what motivates the 
manager to decrease his own financial incentives through a reduction of 
a. He knows tha t by committing to no effort in the second stage, the 
intrinsic motivation of the worker will be utilized more efficiently. If the 
wage reduction implied by commitment is higher than the loss of profit 
induced by the reduction in a  the manager will choose the not-for-profit.
We restrict attention to the case where the worker’s and managers limited 
liability constraints do not bind. As wpp  >  Wjvp it is sufficient to assume:
I- — 7T 1
: i — r  -@ w  < t -  1 — a n
as this implies wjyp > 0 and 7r >  wpp-
It can be shown tha t the for-profit manager will always want to pay the 
wage w pp  to motivate the worker if A l  holds . 61 This finding is im portant as
For a proof see appendix B.3.
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it confirms tha t the for-profit firm is efficient while the not-for-profit is not 
- financial motivation is good for welfare. A financially motivated manager 
wants to pay a high wage to the worker and exert effort himself. 6 2
2.4.3 M an ag e r P re fe ren ce s
We have shown in the previous section tha t the for-profit achieves the first- 
best. Still, because wages are higher in the for-profit, it might be tha t the 
not-for-profit is chosen by the manager.
P ro p o s itio n  7 Assume A l  and A 2. I f  wage payments can only be made 
contingent on the intermediate output, the not-for-profit set-up is preferred 
by the manager if  and only if
h$w  > h + 7r (4)
P ro o f. Since the manager has no way to commit to no effort in the for- 
profit we only have to compare two options (given A l). Either the manager 
chooses a not-for-profit firm and commits to no effort in the second stage or 
he pays the worker a higher wage wpp  and does not commit. The manager 
prefers the not-for-profit if
h(a* (it -  wNP) +  0M) > h(TT -  wpp  +  dM) + (1 — h) [h (tt +  0M) — 1 ] 
inserting the optimal wages and a*
k n M C* ~  ^  > (tt — -  +  ( 1  — h)9w)  +  ( 1  — h) tt +  6 m  — ^
62This case has been ignored by Francois (2000) due to the particular assumptions on 
the equivalent of h in his model. Higher effort costs for the manager only play a role for 
the distribution of welfare between worker and manager.
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simplification of this term yields equation 4. ■
Proposition 7 contains several interesting comparative statics that we 
will analyze in the following sections. Before we discuss equation 4 formally, 
however, we present a visual representation of the condition. Figure 6  shows 
the 9\v — Om  parameter space for an example. 6 3  The dark surface represents 
the manager’s expected utility from the for-profit while the light surface 
represents the expected utility from the not-for-profit. Equation 4 describes 
the line in which both planes intersect.
E xpected  Utility from  For-profit
E xpected  Ut
Figure 6 : Manager Expected Utility
Figure 6  shows that not-for-profits are only attractive for relatively low
values of 9 \.t in combination with relatively high va1|ipR n f  f l i ^ T r y T a r t i n i b r
the graph shows tha t not-for-profits never dominate if 9w  =  0. This is a 
direct result of the fact tha t commitment to no effort makes only sense if 
it implies wage savings for the manager. If Qw = 0 wages are the same in 
both organizational forms and the for-profit is chosen for all 9m -
T he Effect o f Financial Benefit How does the financial benefit of the 
project, 7r, affect the choice of the manager? It is useful to think about this 
comparative static with the help of equation (4). Write the difference of 
expected utility between for- and not-for-profit
Uf p —Unp  =  Ji(f—wpp+Om ) + 0-~h) [h {f +  9m ) ~~ 1 }—h(a* (f — wnp )+9m ) 
the for-profit firm is benefiting more from increasing f if
S U F p  -  U n p  _  h  +  h { 1  _ h ) _  h a .  _  h 6 f  f r  _  W N p )  >  0  
of  Of
which is always the case as a* < 1 and ^  < 0. The for-profit firm becomes 
more attractive with increasing financial benefits because the manager is the 
full residual claimant of these benefits while in the not-for-profit he has to 
give up an increasing share.
T he Effect o f  W orker Intrinsic M otivation  Worker intrinsic motiva­
tion has an ambiguous impact on institutional choice. If we compare the 
marginal effect of 9w  on expected utility we can see that the for-profit be­
comes more attractive with increasing worker intrinsic motivation if
a* < l - h  (5)
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which has the following intuition. Under the not-for-profit, worker intrinsic 
motivation directly reduces the wage payment. The manager, however, does 
not fully capture the benefits of this reduction because a* <  1. In the for- 
profit, the manager is the full residual claimant but intrinsic motivation only 
reduces the wage at the rate 1  — h. As long as a* >  1  — h the not-for-profit 
benefits more from highly motivated workers. If a* < 1  — h, however, the 
for-profit can benefit more from the worker’s intrinsic motivation.
While this effect might look like a rather specific characteristic of our 
model it points to a more general finding. If not-for-profits indeed fulfil the 
purpose of reducing financial incentives, they also reduce the incentive for 
managers to reduce production costs. This implies tha t wage reductions 
gained from worker intrinsic motivation are appreciated less by managers in 
not-for-profit firms . 6 4  Equation (5) shows tha t this effect can dominate the 
higher impact of intrinsic motivation on wages in the not-for-profit.
T h e  E ffect o f  M an ag e r In tr in s ic  M o tiv a tio n  The impact of manager 
intrinsic motivation on equation 4 is clear. W ith rising manager intrin­
sic motivation, the not-for-profit is becoming less attractive. While this is 
somewhat surprising in the light of the discussion on not-for-profit firms is 
has a simple intuition. The not-for-profit penalizes strong intrinsic motiva­
tion because more financial benefit has to be given up to keep the manager 
committed to no effort. In contrast, for the for-profit, the expected payoff 
(which includes both pecuniary and non-pecuniary payoffs of the manager) 
is increasing in the manager’s intrinsic motivation.
64The case of a  =  0 discussed in the appendix B.2 is confirming this intuition.
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2 .5  L ab or M a rk ets  an d  O rg a n iza tio n a l C h o ice
Up until now we assumed tha t workers and managers are matched exoge­
nously with one another. In sectors tha t feature labor mobility or flexible 
organizational form this assumption is not realistic. To model the effects of 
the labor market on organizational choice, we have to allow for an endoge­
nous matching between managers and workers. We maintain the assumption 
tha t managers choose the institutional arrangement and that binding con­
tracts can be written in this regard.
Throughout the section we assume the following equilibrium concept. A 
matching between managers and workers is an equilibrium if no manager or 
worker is able to make an offer to another worker or manager tha t makes 
both (weakly) better off. We assume tha t a manager or worker tha t is 
matched with herself (unemployment) will always receive a payoff of zero.
Before we start with the analysis it might help to develop some intu­
ition of what will happen with endogenous matching. Up until now we 
have focused on the incentives of the manager to choose one organizational 
form or another. The most im portant change to this perspective is tha t 
endogenous matching introduces an additional element of choice on the side 
of the worker. This is im portant because not-for-profits can be attractive 
for the manager but not necessarily for the worker. If managers compete 
for workers in the labor market, tha t can affect institutional choice. In or­
der to be able to discuss endogenous matching, we therefore discuss worker 
preferences first.
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2.5.1 W orker Preferences
Assume A l  and A 2 hold and contracts can only be written on intermediate 
output. The worker’s utility (when exerting effort) is then
Uw — h(Qw +  Wi) +  (1 — h) p m^w — 1
where Pm  = 0  in not-for-profits (because of commitment) and p m  =  h in 
for-profits (by A l). Given optimal wage setting in both organizational forms 
the following holds.
P roposition  8 An intrinsically motivated worker, 6\y > 0, always prefers 
to work in a for-profit firm.
P roof. If the manager chooses a not-for-profit, the optimal wage payment 
from the perspective of the manager is
w\ = wpjp = -  — 9W
and the utility of the worker for this case is therefore
U yyP  —  h($w  +  t  —  @w) —  1 =  0 h,
where the level of expected utility is simply the result of the binding IC 
constraint of the worker. In the for-profit firm the does not commit and the 
worker receives a (higher) wage payment of
wX = wpp  =  — — ( 1  — h)6w- 
h
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with this wage plugged in and p m  =  h  the worker’s utility is
U y f  —  h ( Q w  +  —  —  (1 —  h ) 9 w )  +  (1 —  h )  h 0 w  —  1 
h
which simplifies to
Uwp = h -e w  > u%p
m
Proposition 8  confirms th a t the contractual failure modelled here implies 
a conflict of interest between manager and worker. Even if both organiza­
tional forms were equally efficient, the conflict would persist. To some de­
gree, the not not-for-profit is simply a costly way to commit to free-riding 
for the manager and, hence, the organizational form is never preferred by 
the worker.
While the worker’s preference does not m atter (by construction) in the 
exogenous matching case it can now drive organizational choice if workers 
are scarce and enjoy market power in the endogenous matching.
2.5.2 Equilibrium  w ith  Tw o T ypes o f  W orkers
In this section we demonstrate the effect of worker scarcity on the labor 
market at the example of two worker types. Assume a number a\ of mo­
tivated workers (9w = 9w > 0 ) and a number c&2 of unmotivated workers
(9 \ y  =  0) .
Assume a number of heterogenous managers m  with intrinsic motiva­
tion 9m  G — tt, ^]- We distinguish two groups. Denote the number of
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managers for which equation (4) is satisfied if the worker is motivated
hQ\y > 2  - h  +
~  I
7T
by m \. These managers will choose a not-for-profit when matched with a 
motivated worker. 6 5  Denote the remaining managers by m 2 , where m \ +  
m 2  =  m.
Full em p lo y m en t
P ro p o s itio n  9 Assume that labor is scarce (a\ +  a 2  <  m ). Given A l  and 
A2 there are only for-profit firms in a stable matching.
P ro o f. Given ^42 (and Ow = 0) we have tha t n  > ^ and unmotivated 
workers exert effort if they are paid w \  =  t t . The worker’s market power 
implies th a t wages in the industry are
w 1 7T
regardless of the match. To see this, note tha t all managers exert effort 
in the second stage and therefore (weakly) prefer to be in a for-profit to 
unemployment. Given this pressure from idle managers, no manager in a 
match can afford to pay a wage w\ < 7r. Given the wage, managers (weakly) 
prefer the for-profit setting to the not-for-profit because
h(ir — 7r +  6m)  +  (1 -  h) (h(ir +  0M) -  1) >  h(a  (n — 7r) +  9m)
for all 9m - Lastly, managers and workers earn a rent th a t is independent of
65 Given the analysis in section 2.4.3, no type of manager wants to be in a not-for-profit 
firm with an unmotivated worker.
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the match and we therefore have no sorting in this case. ■
W o rk er U n em p lo y m en t
P ro p o s itio n  10 Assume that there is unemployment amongst motivated 
workers (a\ > m ) .  Given A l  and ^42, all unmotivated workers (Ow =  0) are 
unemployed and there is a not-for-profit sector of size m \. Not-for-profit 
firms pay a lower wage than for-profit firms. The size of the not-for-profit 
sector is decreasing in the financial benefits, ir, that can be gained in the 
industry.
P ro o f. If ai > m , managers are able to select their preferred organizational 
form because they face no competition for motivated workers. This implies 
tha t the size of the not-for-profit sector is given by the set of manager for 
which equation (4) is satisfied, m \. The wage payments are given by the 
respective IC constraints. Since the not-for-profit sector commits managers 
to no effort, wages are lower than in the for-profit sector for a given level of 
Ow > 0 . The size of the sector shrinks with rising financial benefits because 
equation (4) is harder to satisfy if 7r increases. ■
Note tha t equation 4 can be fulfilled for relatively unmotivated man­
agers but not for too motivated managers. In such an equilibrium, highly 
motivated managers create for-profit firms and pay a wage wpp  to  workers. 
Unmotivated managers create not-for-profits and pay wjyp < wpp.
P ro p o s itio n  1 1  Assume a\ -fa ,2 > m  but a\ < m . Given A l  and A2 there 
are only for-profit firms in a stable matching.
P ro o f. There is now some degree of competition for motivated workers since 
all managers prefer to have motivated workers in their firms. This implies
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th a t we have full employment for all workers with Ow = Ow- Note, tha t all 
managers offer the same expected utility, hOw, to the worker if they hire 
into the for-profit. Given tha t motivated workers can always get managers 
out of a match with an unmotivated worker, their preferred organizational 
form, the for-profit, dominates. To see why not-for-profits would not survive, 
imagine all motivated workers are in a match with managers in a not-for- 
profit firm. By a\ < m  there will be some managers who are in a for-profit 
with an unmotivated worker. These managers are then willing to offer a for- 
profit match to a motivated worker tha t makes the worker strictly better 
off. Not-for-profits cannot survive this labor market pressure. ■
In this section we have shown tha t scarcity of motivated workers always 
implies tha t not-for-profit firms disappear because they cannot compete with 
the higher wage payments and higher chances of project success in the for- 
profit sector. Not-for-profits can only survive as an organizational form if 
managers have strong market power in the labor market and only if equation 
(4) is fulfilled for at least some managers, i.e. only if the project in question 
is financially not too attractive, the worker sufficiently motivated and the 
manager not too much.
2 .6  C o n c lu sio n
Volunteering is particularly common in the not-for-profit sector. A possi­
ble explanation is tha t reduced financial incentives for the manager elicits 
intrinsic motivation of the workers. We evaluate this argument in the con­
text of a model of double-sided moral hazard, where the manager and the 
worker move sequentially. Our main contribution to the existing literature 
is tha t we evaluate the argument in a setting where manager and worker
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can self-select into organizational forms.
First, we show th a t for the manager to choose a not-for-profit, it needs to 
provide commitment for the manager not to exert effort. If the commitment 
problem is either not im portant or impossible to solve, the for-profit is the 
only relevant choice. This implies tha t the not-for-profit set-up is chosen 
by the manager if he is not very motivated. Both high financial benefit 
and high intrinsic benefit increase the attractiveness of the for-profit form. 
The reason is that the not-for-profit set-up provides low wage costs by using 
worker intrinsic motivation effectively but does so at the cost of efficiency 
and lower financial returns to the manager.
We show tha t high worker intrinsic motivation can make both the not- 
for-profit and the for-profit relatively attractive, depending on the level of 
the motivation of the manager. If the manager is not very motivated, the 
comparative statics confirm the intuition tha t the not-for-profit sector ben­
efits more from intrinsically motivated workers. If the manager is very 
motivated, though, this effect is dominated by another, more subtle one. 
Reducing the share of profits that go to the manager reduces the benefits 
from cost savings. This implies tha t the wage reduction due to worker in­
trinsic motivation might be appreciated more by a for-profit manager than 
a not-for-profit manager. The impact of intrinsic motivation on wage costs 
is lower in the for-profit but the manager captures the full benefit.
Recent empirical findings in Mocan and Tekin (2003) square well with 
our theoretical results. They study employer-employee matched data on 
child care workers and account for self-selection into organizational forms. 
The authors present a table of means of worker characteristics in the not-for- 
profit and for-profit sector and run a test for significant differences. They 
find no difference in terms of intrinsic motivation between the two groups.
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At the same time, however, their wage estimates indicate tha t intrinsic mo­
tivation lowers wages by more in the not-for-profit sector. These two results 
can be explained with our theory . 6 6  First, for a given set of worker and, 
hence, labor market characteristics, wages are lowered more by intrinsic 
motivation in the not-for-profit sector. Secondly, this does not mean tha t 
the more motivated workers will end up in tha t sector as managers in the 
for-profit sector might appreciate motivated labor more than managers in 
the not-for-profit sector.
Additional insights can be gained from our endogenous matching results. 
P u t somewhat provocatively, the high degree of not-for-profit organizations 
in some sectors could be the result of a combination of unattractiveness of 
projects and the abundance of motivated workers. If managers are finan­
cially or intrinsically motivated they will switch to for-profits instead. And 
if motivated workers have some market power in the labor market they will 
encourage the creation of for-profit firms th a t offer higher wages and higher 
productivity.
A real life example might illustrate this point. There is a quickly growing 
industry of volunteer tourism which combines typical backpacking trips with 
development work. In this sector, not-for-profit firms provide local develop­
ment work for the traveler. Most of the field work requires only uneducated 
labor, available in abundance in the local community. Still, volunteers are 
intrinsically so motivated tha t they are willing to pay the organization to 
get work. The websites organizing the market indicate tha t the impact of 
the volunteer is an im portant consideration for this willingness to pay . 6 7  In
66 Their main result - the positive rent earned by workers in the not-for-profit sector - 
could also be incorporated in our model. Workers need to earn a rent to be compensated 
for the loss of project success probability caused by manager commitment.
67 Google adds for the search voluntourism read for example: ’Make a real difference.
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other words, the labor market features payments from the worker to the 
organization (a negative wage) in return for the opportunity to make a dif­
ference. The nondistribution constraint ensures tha t the firm management 
does not interfere with whatever the volunteer leaves behind and, hence, 
ensures tha t the volunteer is left to  his own devices. His labor input is then 
essential for the success of the project and the not-for-profit can reap the 
full financial benefits of the volunteer’s intrinsic motivation . 6 8
While this is a rather specific example, it suggests a mechanism that 
links intrinsic motivation and the rise of not-for-profits in some sectors. If 
the forces at work under endogenous matching are relevant, the abundance 
of motivated labor in some sectors may induce the rise of not-for-profit 
organizations. But this is not because motivated workers prefer to  work in 
not-for-profits, but because the excess supply of motivated workers make 
the non-profit form more attractive to managers.
If the labor market is segmented into different groups, we would expect 
groups with relatively little opportunities in the market to be more prone to 
not-for-profit employment. The fact tha t particularly not-for-profits special­
ize in employing an old workforce could be regarded as one indicator th a t this 
is not too far fetched . 6 9  Furthermore, our endogenous matching results are 
supported by a striking pattern in the worker characteristics data of Mocan 
and Tekin (2003) mentioned above. According to their tests, Blacks and His- 
panics seem to be significantly overrepresented in not-for-profit firms while 
Whites and workers with college degree are underrepresented. Our theory
Volunteer abroad. 1-12 weeks. Y e a r - r o u n d or ’ Volunteer Abroad. Make a difference. 
Work with kids, wildlife, rainforest conservation.’ There is even a book with the revealing 
title: ’ Volunteer Tourism: Experiences that Make a Difference.’
68 We would expect not-for-profits to charge more and provide less successful projects 
in this context. Two corollaries that might be empirically testable.
69For an example see http://w w w .ses-bonn.de/en/
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suggests tha t this fact is not driven by the stronger interest of Blacks and 
Hispanics in not-for-profit work but by their weaker labor market position.
Our theoretical findings are based on the assumption tha t intrinsic moti­
vation is output based and not related to a second dimension like consumer 
welfare or quality. This implies tha t managers and workers benefit from 
the higher financial returns of the for-profit because it leads to higher pro­
duction. Financial incentives do not harm consumer/donor welfare either 
- whoever benefits from the project also just cares about project success. 
Clearly, these assumptions directly contradict the basic assumptions of con­
tract failure as envisaged by Hansmann (1980). Not surprisingly then, the 
derived picture of not-for-profit firms is a relatively grim one.
This points to a general feature of the argument by Francois (2000). 
The not-for-profit in his (and our) model is not chosen as a remedy for 
contractual failure between manager and consumers or donors but it is cho­
sen because it changes the internal balance of power between manager and 
worker. This view on the not-for-profit stands in some contrast to the usual 
idea of contract failure. One way to see this is to relabel the worker as (labor) 
donor. In our model, the not-for-profit commits the manager to stay idle 
if the donor fails to donate a sufficient amount. This commitment leads to 
more donations which in turn makes the manager choose the not-for-profit 
in some circumstances. While this view might not be too unrealistic in some 
circumstances, it cannot provide a justification for subsidies and tax  cuts for 
not-for-profits.
3 Treat as Neutral: The Norm  o f Political N eu­
trality in State Bureaucracies
We should never let Ministers get so deeply involved. Once they start writing 
the draft, the next thing we know they’ll be dictating policy.
- Sir Frederick Stewaxt, Permanent secretary in the TV-series "Yes Minister"
3.1  In tr o d u ctio n
In most state executives, elected officials are a minority. They are far out­
numbered by thousands of civil servants who pursue a career in public office. 
While these bureaucrats are sometimes portrayed as only implementing the 
decision of their political masters, their true obligations are far more diverse 
and even reach up to drafting entire pieces of legislation . 7 0  In this article, 
we study the role of the bureaucrat as an advisor to the elected official. A 
role tha t is most obviously played within the ministries and its departments 
and is of crucial importance for a functioning government. 71
The reason that civil servants work as advisors to the elected official 
is their often considerable edge in relevant knowledge. As one of the first 
scholars, Max Weber observed tha t this advantage in expertise is a mixed 
blessing. In Weber (1988), he stresses tha t specialized knowledge existing 
within the bureaucracy cannot be perfectly controlled by an uninformed 
principal. If bureaucrats have different political interests than their superi­
ors, the resulting political conflict can harm effective cooperation between 
the bureaucrat and the politician. The potential problem is described, for
'°See for example Page (2003) on a reveiling study conducted in the United Kingdom.
71 See Hart and Wille (2006), Dolan (2000), Dowding (1995), Ingraham (1987) and 
Putnam (1973) for evidence on the importance of this function in a different time and 
country settings.
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example, by Sir John Hoskyns, policy advisor to M argaret Thatcher. In his 
analysis of the role of British bureaucracy he writes about the role of the 
civil servant
[...] it must never be suggested that his efforts might contribute in the 
end to electoral success for his political masters. I f  he started to worry about 
it, his position would soon become impossible. For the only way he could be 
sure that he was not furthering his m inister’s political aims would be to lean 
in the other direction- perhaps to the extent o f low-key political sabotage! But 
of course most ministers suspect he is doing that half the time anyway...72
W hat are the institutional answers to this problem? One feature tha t 
is often mentioned in this context is the norm of political neutrality of the 
bureaucrat . 7 3  At first sight this seems more like an attem pt to assume 
the problem away than a solution - impartiality is hard to implement if 
the bureaucrat cannot be controlled. And indeed, there is some consensus 
tha t a rational bureaucracy, a bureaucracy that works as a perfect tool for 
the politician, remains out of reach . 7 4  However, this does not prevent the 
normative message of a neutral civil service to be strongly heard . 7 5  We 
explain here how political neutrality could be re-interpreted to explain its 
survival. Neutrality could be the prescription to keep political viewpoints 
hidden. If bureaucrats are not supposed to make their views public, less is 
known about these views.
This article shows tha t by inducing secrecy, the norm of political neu­
trality can partially defuse the conflict between politicians and bureaucrats
72Hoskyns (1982), p. 144-145
73 See for example the US Congress, House Committee on Post Office and the Civil 
Service (1976).
74See Smith (1988) for a more elaborate argument.
75Peters (1995) notes this astonishing survival of what he calls an ancient proverb and 
argues that it must come as an advantage to both politicians and civil servants.
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without actually making the individual bureaucrat politically neutral. Our 
analysis of this problem is based on a simplified version of the cheap talk 
model introduced by Crawford and Sobel (1982). We show tha t communica­
tion between a bureaucrat and a politician can improve if the politician does 
not know the bureaucrat’s preference. The reason is tha t if the preference of 
his bureaucrat (sender) is unknown, the politician (receiver) has to interpret 
the signal sent by the bureaucrat with his conditional beliefs, i.e. an (up­
dated) average of possible bureaucrat preferences. He will therefore tend to 
trust a bureaucrat with non-aligned interests more than he would if he knew 
her preferences. This in turn gives the bureaucrat less incentives to distort 
her report and improves communication. The benefits of this improvement 
can be so substantial tha t they balance the fact tha t the bureaucrat can 
now manipulate the politician. It is then beneficial to both bureaucrat and 
politician to keep the bureaucrat’s preferences hidden.
The structure of the article is as follows. We first present related litera­
ture. Section 3.3 then presents a simplified version of the model by Crawford 
and Sobel (CS) with observable types. We show that, despite its simplicity, 
our version of the model allows for a discussion of the arising inefficiencies 
in the sender-receiver game. Section 3.4 analyzes the role of commitment in 
improving communication between the politician and the bureaucrat. Build­
ing on these findings, we introduce a model of communication with unknown 
types and present our main results in section 3.5. Section 3.6 concludes.
3 .2  L itera tu re
This article relates to an extensive body of articles both through the frame­
work chosen and the question it tries to answer. In this section we first
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discuss our assumptions on the contractual environment in the context of 
related literature. We then review the quickly growing literature tha t modi­
fies CS and pay special attention to several recent contributions tha t overlap 
with our theoretical analysis.
Crawford and Sobel (1982) assume th a t the sender and receiver of com­
munication share a broad policy objective - an action tha t can only be taken 
by the receiver but affects both parties. This shared effect of the action gives 
an intrinsic incentive to the informed sender for meaningful communication, 
without the need for any contractual arrangement or reputation concerns.
One of the main contributions of Crawford and Sobel is to show that 
communication becomes less precise with growing bias of the sender. They 
argue tha t while a perfectly aligned sender is able to communicate fine nu­
ances of the state of the world, a biased sender is only able to tell the receiver 
tha t the state is within a certain interval - the more biased the sender, the 
coarser the partition of the message space. We fix the amount of messages 
tha t are sent in equilibrium and show tha t communication still suffers in 
efficiency with rising bias. The reason is tha t the message space is skewed 
increasingly with rising bias - some states of the world can be communicated 
more precisely than others . 76
Aghion and Tirole (1997) study a very similar situation but endogenize 
the amount of information the sender and receiver have. In their frame­
work, the incentive to collect information and communicate comes from two 
sources. Similar to CS they assume tha t incentives are partially aligned. 
The best option for the decision-maker (advisor) also yields weakly positive 
utility to the advisor (decision-maker). In addition, they assume the ex­
,6It should be noted that this effect establishes a connection to Cukierman and Tommasi 
(1998).
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istence of a very bad option tha t prohibits blind choosing of a project on 
the side of the receiver. A conceptually crucial difference to the analysis 
provided here is tha t Aghion and Tirole focus on the optimal allocation of 
decision rights. They follow the incomplete contract theory in pointing out 
tha t the allocation of authority can be re-interpreted as ownership of an 
asset or a contract arrangement tha t give the decision-right. This formally 
allocated authority is undermined by the presence of superior information 
with the agent. Their proposal is to delegate formal authority.
This basic policy prescription is shared by Dessein (2002). He transfers 
the question of optimal allocation of authority into the cheap talk frame­
work and shows tha t it can be beneficial for the decision-maker to accept 
the loss of control. The driving factor behind his result lies within the par­
ticular mechanism at work in cheap talk games tha t we analyze in section 
3.3. Despite the shared origin of our and his results there are considerable 
differences in the assumptions we make on the contractual environment.
Dessein (2002) assumes tha t while contracts cannot be written, the al­
location of decision rights is possible within organizations. This allocation 
of a decision right could be reached through the ownership of assets7 7  or 
the access to critical resources7 8  and might be partially possible in state bu­
reaucracies . 7 9  In this context our results can be regarded as an additional 
option - even in the absence of a direct commitment device, the absence of 
information can improve efficiency.
Note that parallel to the controversy in the economics literature there is
"For a link between asset allocation and decision right see Grossman and Hart (1986) 
and Hart and Moore (1990).
78 See Rajan and Zingales (1998) for a related argument.
,9The informal allocation of decision rights and the constant struggle this entails can 
be observerd in the TV-series "Yes Minister" from which we drew our entry citation.
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a similar discussion in political science. Several authors have argued for an 
application of a theory relying on incentive contracts to analyze bureaucra­
cies. 8 0  This literature analyzes the institutional setting in which bureaucrats 
act and try to show their impact on the incentives of civil servants. This 
approach faces some criticism. Page and Jenkins (2005), for example, ar­
gue in their study of middle ranking civil-service in the United Kingdom 
tha t if institutional arrangements become sufficiently vague or informal, en­
forceability is questionable. They reason that the principal-agent approach 
is therefore not fit to address the reality as it appears in their study. We 
hope tha t the cheap talk framework might fill part of the gap left by these 
concerns. Even without relational contracts, cooperation between politi­
cian and bureaucrat can be possible because both are working towards the 
common goal of formulating effective policy.
Recent years have seen a lively interest in variations of the cheap talk 
game. Given tha t our analysis cannot be nested in any of them, we see 
our contribution in complementing and expanding the existing research. 
In addition, the similarity to some of the results presented here give us 
confidence tha t our model could be generalized beyond its convenient form.
Both Li (2004) and Morgan and Stocken (2003) derive communication 
equilibria in a type space of two sender types (0, b and —5, b) and no restric­
tions on the signalling space. Depending on the magnitude of the bias, b, 
their equilibria can be separated in two categories. The first follows CS and 
separates the message space in N sub-categories with both types sending 
signals only on these categories. The second equilibrium category allows 
for a range of states in which the action follows the specific message sent. 
However, these equilibria seem to rely heavily on the restriction of the type
80 See, for example, McCubbins et al (1987) or Huber (2000).
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space. The decision-maker follows the message sent by the bureaucrat only 
for some values and has to know exactly where to stop following the advice. 
In a richer type space an interpretation of signals along these lines seems 
unlikely . 8 1
The first type of equilibrium, however, shares some features with the 
equilibrium presented here. This is not surprising as our restriction to a 
N  = 2 signalling space can be reached endogenously for some values of b. 
How exactly these different assumptions fit together is hard to say without 
a rigorous generalization. More importantly, the welfare implications of the 
two approaches seem to differ significantly. In the restricted type space of Li 
(2004), ignorance of the decision-maker towards the type of his bureaucrat 
weakly dominates knowing the type. In our model this is not the case.
Dimitrakas and Sarafidis (2005) present a revealing generalization of the 
framework discussed by Morgan and Stocken (2003). They specify the na­
ture of all possible equilibria for every distribution of types with support 
[0,1]. Interestingly, their strategy description for the sender is very similar 
to the one discussed here, despite the more complex message space they 
allow for. While their results are more general in that respect, they restrict 
their attention to positive biases of the sender. More importantly, perhaps, 
Dimitrikas and Sarafidis (2005) do not discuss any welfare implications. The 
question on whether the type of the bureaucrat should be known or unknown 
remains unanswered.
The results presented here relate to a very general finding in economics. 
A second best situation can be made better by adding further inefficiencies. 
The effect of adding further noise to the standard cheap talk model has been
81 In fact the Dimitrikas and Sarafidis (2005) confirm this suspicion in their discussion 
of Morgan and Stocken (2003).
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first brought forward by Myerson (1991). In his example, a dove is used as 
an unreliable device for cheap talk communication and actually improves 
it. This idea has been explored in two recent articles, Blume, Board and 
Kawamura (2007) and Kawamura (2006). Kawamura (2006) relates most 
closely to ideas presented here. He studies a whole class of cheap talk games 
th a t share a similar outcome in terms of equilibrium strategies and welfare 
implications. Most importantly for the analysis presented here, Kawamura 
discusses the role of commitment of the receiver for improving communica­
tion. In his framework, this commitment is reached through multiple senders 
and assuming particular institutional settings (anonymity, equal treatm ent 
etc.). While these institutional arrangements come at a high cost for the 
decision maker, they can be beneficial if they improve communication suffi­
ciently. The main difference of our work is tha t we do not assume multiple 
senders to create commitment but asymmetric information about the sender 
type.
3 .3  B en ch m a rk  - T y p e  O b servab le
This section serves as an introduction to our notation and represents a first 
building block for our analysis in section 3.5. We first discuss our simpli­
fied version of the cheap talk game with known types. Despite significant 
simplification of the CS framework, their main result is maintained. Com­
munication between bureaucrat and politician deteriorates with increasing 
bias and completely breaks down if the bias is too large. The mechanism 
driving this result is a vicious circle of exaggeration by the bureaucrat and 
mistrust by the politician . 8 2  It is this re-enforcing problem of m istrust and
82 The citation in the introduction captures large parts of the intuition for this finding.
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exaggeration tha t is central to the gains from commitment and, hence, un­
observed types.
3.3.1 G am e D escription
The model has two actors - a politician (pol) and a bureaucrat (bur). While 
the bureaucrat has some potentially useful information she cannot take a 
decision by herself but sends a signal, n, to the decision maker who then 
takes an action x  6  R. We write the utility of the politician
Upoi = - \ m - x \
where m  denotes the state of the world and is assumed to be uniformly 
distributed on [0,1]. Given this utility function, the politician maximizes his 
expected utility by matching his action x  to his conditional expectation of 
state of the world E [ m  \ n].
We assume tha t the bureaucrat is biased from the viewpoint of the politi­
cian in tha t she always prefers an action tha t is b higher (lower) than his 
preferred action. When sending her signal, she therefore maximizes the value 
of
Ubur = — \m + b — x\
where b is drawn from a known distribution f(b).  In order to simplify the 
analysis we assume tha t f(b)  is symmetric around zero . 8 3
It is im portant to note tha t our assumptions about the utility function 
do not drive the mechanics of this model. In particular, the canonical case 
of a square utility function delivers very similar results in terms of equilib­
83For a discussion of this important assumption see the conclusion.
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rium strategies. However, the formulation of a closed form solution of the 
equilibrium and the discussion of welfare are facilitated considerably by this 
assumption.
We simplify the cheap talk game of CS by assuming tha t while the politi­
cian can take any action x e l ,  the bureaucrat can only send two different 
signals n  6  {high, l ow} . This assumption is clearly restrictive and lowers 
overall efficiency. However, we can show tha t equilibrium outcomes of the 
game still reflect the basic logics of CS.
In summary, the game structure is as follows
• The type of the bureaucrat is publicly drawn from f(b).
• Information m  is revealed to the bureaucrat.
•  The bureaucrat sends a signal, n  € {high, low}, to the politician.
•  The politician chooses an action x.
3.3.2 Equilibrium  Strategies
Note tha t the game structure perfectly matches the one described in CS. 
This section therefore follows their model of communication and translates 
their findings into the present framework. For now, our only departure from 
their framework remains the assumption tha t the bureaucrat (sender) will 
always partition the message space into two subintervals and send a signal 
only on these intervals.
In what follows, we focus on pure strategy equilibria. We further disre­
gard the possibility of a babbling equilibrium for small \b\.84 Given these two
84 See CS for a defence of this assumption. In our context of a restricted message space 
it seems even more plausible because the institutions that determine the message space 
might also determine expectations of sender and receiver.
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additional assumptions we can differentiate between two cases. If |fe| < 
communication between the bureaucrat and politician is meaningful, i.e. 
the signal sent by the bureaucrat contains useful information for the politi­
cian. As b > \  the two individuals involved in the communication diverge 
too strongly in their interests to allow any meaningful communication in 
equilibrium and only the babbling equilibrium remains.
S m all b ias (\b\ < | )  In the last stage of the game the politician takes an 
action x  so to maximize his utility given his conditional beliefs on m. Given 
his utility function, the politician’s actions simply match his conditional 
beliefs on the state m. Equilibrium actions are
x*{n) = E {m  | n), n  € {high, low}
Note tha t since we restricted the message space to two different signals 
there can only be two distinct equilibrium actions triggered by these signals. 
Denote the two equilibrium actions xi = x*(n =  low) and Xh =  x*{n = 
high).
How does the conflict of interest, b, between bureaucrat and politician 
affect these equilibrium actions? Given tha t the difference in ideology is 
observed, the politician knows that the bureaucrat is biased and sends dis­
torted signals from the politician’s point of view. For any pair of equilibrium 
actions x\, x^  the biased sender will have a clear preference for one of them 
at a point where the receiver is indifferent.
If the bureaucrat’s bias, b, is positive for example, she gives a signal 
towards Xh in situations in which the politician prefers x*. The politician 
anticipates this behavior and discounts any signal coming from a biased
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bureaucrat. The bureaucrat reacts by distorting his signals accordingly.
P roposition  12 Assume |6| <  ^. In a communication game with perfect 
information on bureaucrat type, equilibrium actions of the politician are xi =  
\  — b and Xh = \  — b. The bureaucrat sends a signal n = low for all 
m  6  [0 , \  — 2b] and n = high otherwise.
Proof. For a proof of the proposition see the appendix C .l. ■
Note two interesting features of this equilibrium. First, the politician 
skews his actions in the opposite direction of b. He does so in an anticipa­
tion of the incentives of the bureaucrat to bias her signals. Secondly, this 
anticipation of the bureaucrat’s bias by the politician amplifies the inefficien­
cies in communication. W ithout bias, the bureaucrat switches from sending 
the signal low to the signal high at m =  \ . The biased bureaucrat switches 
at point sp(b) given by
/ 1 \ _  xi +  x h 1
sP(b) =  g 2
, i.e. with rising bias, b, the threshold is skewed twofold. As we will see 
later, this is an im portant characteristic of the communication game with 
known types.
Figure 7 and 8  describe the equilibrium and the implied skewing of the 
message space graphically. Figure 7 shows the equilibrium outcomes of a 
game in which the bureaucrat has a bias of b = 0. The equilibrium actions of 
the politician are xi = Xh = § and the bureaucrat switches from sending 
the signal n  =  low to n = high  at m  =
This situation changes drastically if we introduce a positive bias b > 0. 
The equilibrium outcome is depicted in figure 8 . While both actions x i , Xh
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Xi Xr 1
sp(0)
Figure 7: Equilibrium with no bias
shift to the left by £>, the switching point, sp(b), is now at \  — 2b. Note, 
tha t part of this shift of sp(b) is driven by the anticipation of the change of 
equilibrium actions. In other words: the mistrust of the politician amplifies 
the incentive to exaggerate for the bureaucrat. This spiral of mistrust and 
exaggeration is of crucial importance for welfare considerations.
4 4
X! . . .  Xrsp(b)
Figure 8 : Equilibrium with positive bias
The skewing of the equilibrium actions and signalling to a significant loss 
of efficiency. This becomes clear if we look at the ex-ante expected utilities 
of the two actors. The politician’s expected utility is
sp(b) i
EUpoi =  -  J  \ m - X i \ p o l -  j  \ m - x l \ p o l
0 sp(b)
=  - 1 - 2  b2
This is lower than the ex-ante utility without bias EU^ol = — | .  Similarly,
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it can be shown tha t the expected utility of bureaucrat is
E U ir = EUR - 1 b 2 = - ^ - i b 2
which is strikingly low given the fact tha t the bureaucrat holds informa­
tion. The reason is tha t the biased bureaucrat cannot fool the politician in 
equilibrium. Her position as a sender of information therefore only creates 
inefficiencies but gives her no influence on the final decision. A biased bu­
reaucrat would therefore agree to be replaced by and unbiased bureaucrat 
because this lowers the inefficiencies in communication.
L arge b ias ( |6 | >  | )  If the ideological difference between politician and 
bureaucrat exceeds the threshold |6 | =  communication between the two 
does not convey any information because the conflict of interest is so large 
tha t every signal sent by the bureaucrat will be misinterpreted. In other 
words, |6 | >  |  implies that the bureaucrat only sends one of the two signals. 
A bureaucrat with b = for example, sends the signal n = high  for all 
m. Put differently, the signal loses its informational content. Knowing tha t 
this is the case, the politician will chose the action x* = \  regardless of the 
signal sent.
This does not mean that for all |6 | > |  the conflict of interest is too 
important to accommodate any possibility of communication. The reason for 
the breakdown of informative communication at a relatively low bias is the 
spiral of exaggeration by the bureaucrat and discounting by the politician. 
The next section discusses this in more detail.
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3 .4  T h e  R o le  o f  C o m m itm en t
Let us turn  towards the question of commitment and how it could improve 
communication and ex ante utility. Crawford and Sobel (1982) stress tha t if 
the sender (bureaucrat) could commit to truth-telling, both players would 
benefit ex ante. In our version of CS, the actions xi = |  and Xh = \  are 
the best response to truth-telling by the bureaucrat. W hat would happen 
if the politician could commit to these actions without of a commitment of 
the bureaucrat to tell the truth?
This commitment to be naive improves ex ante utility for the bureaucrat 
as she is now be able to manipulate the politician. In the case of low b, for 
example, the bureaucrat has an expected utility of EU s = — § — b2 which is 
better than the outcome derived above.
More surprisingly perhaps, even the politician can profit from his com­
mitment despite the fact tha t he is manipulated by the bureaucrat.
P roposition  13 For |6| < yA* | ~ 2 the politician has a higher ex-ante ex­
pected utility from committing to the actions xi = |  and Xh = § than from  
any equilibrium without commitment.
Proof. We show in the appendix C.2 that for |6 | <  \  the politician receives 
EUpoi =  — |  — b2. This is better than the outcome EUpoi = — |  — 2b2 
w ithout commitment. This advantage, however, shrinks as the conflict of 
interest grows and becomes a disadvantage at b = v'*f~ 2  . ■
To understand this result first re-examine the equilibrium without com­
mitment from the previous section. The politician discounted the bureau­
crat completely and thereby amplified the fact tha t more signals were sent 
towards one of the two actions only. This outcome is transformed if the
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politician can commit to trust the bureaucrat. The bureaucrat now skews 
her message space less and if the conflict of interest is not too large, both 
individuals benefit ex ante. Formally, the point sp(b), changed at the rate 
2b without commitment and changes at the rate b with commitment.
Figure 9 displays a graphic representation if the situation with commit­
ment. A comparison of figures 7, 8  and 9 reveals the trade-off the politician 
faces when deciding for or against a commitment to the actions xi = |  
and Xh — First note tha t he loses expected utility compared to figure 
7 because the bureaucrat shifts his switching point, sp{b), towards the left. 
However, he could be better of than in the situation depicted in figure 8  
because this shift is relatively small.
4
Figure 9: Outcome with commitment
W hat is the significance of the possible welfare improvement through 
commitment? We show in the following section tha t the absence of informa­
tion regarding the type of the bureaucrat implies some degree of commitment 
for the politician.
3 .5  T y p e  U n o b serv a b le
In this section we assume tha t the politician does not observe the type of 
his bureaucrat. As before, a random bureaucrat is drawn from a symmetric 
(around zero) distribution /(&) but only she knows her type. We believe tha t 
this assumption can reflect reality in bureaucracies where a large number
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of civil servants advise the minister (or politically appointed senior civil 
servants) on policies dealt with by their department. Since the politician 
faces a distribution of types, he no longer discounts the signal sent by the 
bureaucrat according to her bias anymore. Instead, the informational setting 
commits the politician to treating the bureaucrat as an (updated) average.
In order to make the intuition clear, it is useful to think of the somewhat 
artificial case of a distribution of types tha t has (almost) its entire mass at 
b = 0. This distribution acts like a commitment device to the actions xi = ^ 
and Xh = |  because it makes the politician believe he is advised by his own 
type. This commitment even works if the politician is advised by one of the 
rare bureaucrats with |6 | >  0  but only as long as her type is not observed. 
Following the discussion in the previous section, both actors therefore profit 
(for \b\ not too high) from an arrangement in which the politician is not able 
to observe the bureaucrat’s political views.
We start to show this formally by introducing the equilibrium outcome 
of the modified game. We then prove tha t given these equilibrium outcomes 
there are some |6 | >  0  in some f(b)  for which the politician prefers to have 
no information on the bureaucrat’s type. This can imply tha t the politician 
prefers to hold no information on the type of his bureaucrat.
3.5.1 E q u ilib riu m  S tra teg ie s
P ro p o s itio n  14 Denote the (cumulative) density function of bureaucrat 
types by (F{b)) f{b) and assume that f(b) is symmetric around 0. Define
A ^ - j  f(b)b2db
-0.5
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In a communication game with no information on bureaucrat type, equilib­
rium actions o f the politician are
The bureaucrat sends a signal n = low for all m  € [0, \  — b] and n  =  high  
otherwise.
Proof. For a proof of the proposition see the appendix C.3. ■
First note tha t equilibrium actions in this case are symmetric around 
For values of A  close to \  these equilibrium actions represent a commitment 
to trust the bureaucrat. We have shown in the previous section that this 
commitment can be beneficial for the politician if |6 | is relatively small. The 
reason is tha t bureaucrats now switch from sending the signal n =  low to 
n =  high at m =  \  — b and not m  = ^ — 2b. This reduced skewing of the 
message space improves information transmission.
The term A  describes the influence of Bayesian updating on the actions
F ( - )  iof the politician. If all types have values of b close to 0, ^ and the
0.5
term J  f(b)b2db is close to 0 . Overall, A  is then close to |  and the politician 
-0.5
trusts his bureaucrats because he knows th a t their interests are similar.
For every bureaucrat type |6 | >  ^, however, F(^)  decreases (recall tha t 
we assumed symmetric f(b))  and equilibrium actions move towards the value 
The intuitive reason is tha t for |6 | >  \  bureaucrats send only one of the 
two signals regardless of m and the informational content of the average
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signal received by the politician decreases. Note further that the maximum
of the term J  f ( b ) b^b  is reached when half of the bureaucrats are of type
-0.5
b = \  and the other half at b = — ^ . 8 5  It therefore never exceeds | .  The 
term reflects the Bayesian updating for types within the interval [—5 , 5 ]. 
The more bureaucrats have values close to b = \  the more will they tend 
towards sending only one signal. Again the politician reacts by moving 
towards ^ with his actions.
Taken together, this implies tha t A  G [ |,^ ] -  If the politician is only 
advised by bureaucrats with |6 | > \  there is never any meaningful message 
and A  =  As soon as there are some bureaucrats with |6 | < \  there is 
some use to communication because A  >
One feature of an equilibrium with A  >  |  is tha t the message the bu­
reaucrat sends, never fully reveals his type. This pooling character of the 
equilibrium has im portant implications for our interpretation of proposition 
14. In our application, this finding implies tha t given a pool of moderate 
civil servants, the politician listens to each type of civil servants equally well.
3.5.2 W elfare Im plications
Proposition  15 Denote the density function o f bureaucrat types by f(b).  
For all symmetric f(b) with A  >  |  there are some values of |i>| >  0 for which 
the politician would prefer not to know the type o f the bureaucrat.
Proof. Given the analysis in section 3.4, we can focus on the case in which 
the equilibrium actions under unknown types are close to Denote the 
equilibrium actions by x/ =  \  — e and Xh = |  where e > 0  by assumption.
85 Note the similarities to the variance of b.
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It remains to be shown tha t for some value of b the politician receives 
a higher expected utility from not knowing 6 ’s type than from knowing it. 
Existence is most easily shown for b > Note tha t in this case there 
is no meaningful communication between bureaucrat and politician if the 
la tter knows the type of his bureaucrat. His expected utility is therefore 
EU^oi = — Expected utility in the unknown type case is
e u ;o1 =  - x h ~  (x h ~  x l)sP(b) +  ^ ~  x h
replacing sp(b) = \  — b we can rewrite the condition
1
> " 4
x h -  (Xh -  x l ) { \  -  t>) +  i  -  x h 
Substituting xi and Xh and simplifying we get
( l - e ) e
b < ~ 2 -
As e > 0  this condition is always satisfied for some (small) b. m 
The proposition shows tha t for a relatively general distribution of bu­
reaucrat types there are some civil servants tha t should not reveal their 
type to the elected official when advising him on policy x. Of course, this 
statement alone is still relatively weak because it does not give any infor­
mation on whether the politician would like to be generally informed about 
his bureaucrats or not.
However, it can be shown tha t for many reasonable distributions, f ( b ), 
the politician prefers to stay ignorant regarding the type of his bureaucrat 
rather than knowing her type. This becomes clear if we look at figure 10. It 
depicts the ex ante utility of a politician from bureaucrats with types b >  0
108
and given a distribution f(b) which leads to A = 0.4.86
We can roughly distinguish three intervals. For bureaucrats with small 
6, the politician prefers to know the type of his bureaucrat. The reason is 
that knowing the type of the bureaucrat is actually good for communication  
if b is small - treating her advice as coming from an updated average is doing 
her injustice.
a-  type unknown
type known
-0 .3
b
Figure 10: Ex ante expected utility of the politician advised by a bureaucrat of 
type b (A = 0.4)
This changes if the bureaucrat is of a type with a higher b. Knowing 
the type of the bureaucrat in such a situation is a disadvantage because 
communication is heavily distorted and becomes meaningless at b = | . The 
advantage of not knowing a moderate bureaucrat’s type lies in the fact that 
she skews her signals less (sp(b) =  \  — b compared to sp(b) = ^ — 2b) 
and therefore provides the politician with a higher expected payoff. If it is 
sufficiently likely that the bureaucrat comes from this interval, the politician
86 Note that the symmetric picture could be drawn for b <  0.
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prefers not to know her type.
It can be shown, for example, tha t A = 0.4 can be created by a distri­
bution of bureaucrats in which half have b = —0.32 and the other half has 
b = 0.32. As can be seen in figure 10, this bias places all of the bureaucrats 
in the interval in which the politician has a higher utility from not knowing 
the type of his bureaucrat. The politician therefore welcomes institutions 
tha t keep his bureaucrat’s type a secret.
Finally, for large 6 , the ignorance of the politician makes him the victim 
of manipulation bureaucrat - the politician would prefer to know the type 
of these sort of bureaucrats as he should not listen to them. At b = \  
communication becomes meaningless because an bureaucrat with tha t type 
would sends the signal n  =  high  for all m.
While it is not at the focus of this article, it should be noted tha t ex 
ante utility of the bureaucrat follows a similar pattern. A bureaucrat with 
small b prefers to make her type known to the politician while a bureaucrat 
with intermediate bias prefers to keep her type a secret. However, for a 
bureaucrat with even larger bias, this preference is not reversed. As long as 
the politician follows equilibrium actions xi ^  xh bureaucrats with a large 
absolute bias will always strictly prefer to keep their type hidden.
If signalling types is easy, this implies an interesting time-inconsistency 
problem for bureaucrat and politician. To see this, assume that once a 
bureaucrat is picked, she has the opportunity to signal the politician her 
type. We know tha t all types within a small range around b = 0 will 
always want to do so. This, however, changes the conditional beliefs of the 
politician if the type is not revealed. He will adjust his actions by moving 
them towards \  which means tha t more bureaucrat types would want to 
reveal their type to him. The signalling opportunity hereby destroys the
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equilibrium in proposition 15 and can even lead to  a complete revelation 
for some /(&). Even if the politician and a majority of bureaucrats ex ante 
prefer to keep types hidden.
3.5 .3  A n Exam ple
Returning to the politician we have argued tha t for type distributions with 
enough mass of bureaucrats with values of b close to 0 , the politician ex 
ante prefers to face an unknown type to a known type. In what follows, we 
discuss an example to explain this im portant implication of proposition 15.
Assume tha t types b are uniformly distributed between [— ^]. Given
this restriction of the support we have tha t F{ \ )  = 1 and f(b)  =  1 for all 
b. Using the definition of A  we can calculate A = Following proposition 
14, the actions with unknown type are then xi = |  and Xh =  | .  In order 
to evaluate the ex-ante utility from the uniform distribution of bureaucrats, 
we have to first evaluate the ex-ante utility for all values of b. Denote 
E  (Up0i | bj the ex-ante expected utility for the politician from a known 
type b. In figure 10, we can clearly observe tha t utility has a kink at the 
point where communication breaks down. Formally,
" w<!'  '  \ - i  1/ w > i
Denote the ex-ante expected utility from an unknown bureaucrat b by 
EUpoi I b. Given the actions x\ — ^ and Xh = \  we have three intervals of 
the expected utility function
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- ^ - f >2 i f  |6 | <  i
E(U?o l \b) = \  i f  i < | 6 | <  1
- |  i f  5  <  H
where we present the last interval just for matching our formal description 
to figure 10. Given the support of the example, [— , we do not require
it. Again, the kink in figure 10 matches the point \b\ = A bureaucrat 
with a larger bias (in absolute terms) sends only one signal.
Note first tha t — |  \  and — ^  < — | .  This implies th a t for values
of b close to ^ and close to 0 , the politician would ex-ante prefer to know 
the type of his bureaucrat. However, for a range of intermediate types, 
|6 | G [0.12,0.41], the politician prefers to not know who advises him.
Given the two functions it can be shown tha t the politician prefers not to 
know the type of a random draw from the uniform on [—5 , 5 ]- To see this, 
note tha t the overall expected utility from facing a uniform distribution on 
[—5 , 5 ] and knowing the type is
EU^ol =  - 2 — +  2  b db +  — 16
and from not knowing the type
e u ; o1
■ I  1
f h +b2dh+J l  + l bdb
so tha t clearly
10
48
14
81
E U ^, > EU
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3 .6  C o n c lu s io n
In this article we model communication between a politician and a civil ser­
vant and evaluate the welfare outcomes with known and unknown bureaucrat 
types. We show tha t not knowing the political views of a bureaucrat can be 
beneficial to the politician. The reason for this advantage is tha t the politi­
cian assumes the civil servant to be an average civil servant. This belief of 
the politician can be viewed as a commitment to trust the bureaucrat. Com­
munication improves because this treatm ent of the civil servant diminishes 
her incentives to distort her advice. While this effect is not dominant for all 
types of civil servants it can be the decisive factor in an ex-ante perspective.
The formal proof of our result relies heavily on the assumption of sym­
metric distributions of bureaucrat types. However, it can be shown that, 
even in our simplified model, very similar results hold for asymmetric dis­
tributions. The specific values of equilibrium actions and welfare have to 
be approximated in that setting, though. We believe that this justifies the 
symmetry assumption tha t is rather unique for our study.
Two other options of dealing with the inefficiency of communication are 
im portant in the context of bureaucracies. First, according to Dessein (2002) 
the allocation of a decision right to the bureaucrat might improve welfare 
for the politician. Such an allocation of authority has the additional ad­
vantage of making the action infinitely precise. However, when we compare 
the solution proposed in this article with the allocation of a decision right 
it becomes clear tha t there is no clear dominance between them. The ad­
vantage of secrecy is tha t it can make communication possible between a 
politician and strongly biased bureaucrats while the allocation of authority
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fails to connect politician and bureaucrat in this case . 8 7  Political neutrality 
is most useful if a moderate politician has to be connected with expertise 
contained in a bureaucracy of a wide range of political views.
Secondly, letting the politician choose his advisor is clearly dominating. 
Not only is this setting preferred by the politician but it can actually be 
preferred by a large share of biased bureaucrats as well. And indeed, the 
appointment of bureaucrats by politicians, usually along party lines, is a 
practice that remains common even after the introduction of a career civil 
service.
However, we show in chapter 1  th a t this practice of patronage might go 
hand in hand with a loss of competence because recruitment along political 
lines prevents recruitment of the most competent candidate . 8 8  Assuming 
recruitment and promotion by merit, the politician looses control over his 
subordinates. We have shown here th a t if the politician faces an exogenously 
given distribution of bureaucrats, less information on their political views 
can be beneficial. Hence, political neutrality as a norm could be the attem pt 
to improve the flow of information between a politically heterogeneous bu­
reaucracy recruited by merit and the political leadership.
This reveals a complementarity between the commitment towards the 
merit principle and the norm of political neutrality. On the one hand, re­
cruitment by merit makes neutrality a second-best solution to the commu­
nication problem. On the other hand, political neutrality requires tha t the 
politician is not involved in the recruitment procedures which is exactly
87Note, for example, that in the case of A =  0.4 discussed above, the politician gains 
from communicating with bureaucrats of type |6| =  0.32; something that is impossible in 
Dessein’s soluation because the decision right is not allocated to the bureaucrat in this 
case.
88 See Ingraham (1987) for an account of this loss within the United States executive 
under Reagan.
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what recruitment by merit requires, too. It is therefore no wonder th a t re­
cruitment and promotion in the career civil service are designed to reduce 
political involvement in the process8 9  while the recruited bureaucrats are at 
the same time discouraged to make their political opinion public . 9 0
89 This typically includes the use of state examinations and the reduction of places filled 
through political appointment or recommendation. The US Pendleton Act of 1883, for 
example, stresses that no recommendation letters are to be handed in for an applicant to 
the civil service.
90For an early discussion in the United Kingdom see Clark (1959).
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Conclusion
In this concluding chapter, I will summarize and critically reflect on the 
main results of each chapter.
The first chapter conceptualizes two sets of bureaucratic institutions, 
patronage and meritocracy, as different mechanisms of recruitment and pro­
motion of bureaucrats. I show tha t patronage guarantees politically ho­
mogenous governments in situations where political loyalty is important. 
However, meritocratic recruitment and promotion can be interpreted as a 
commitment to ignore loyalty considerations. This commitment can increase 
competence in comparison to patronage by channeling political competition 
into the bureaucracy.
The main aim of the first chapter is to explain how the distribution of 
political power within a state affects the choice between meritocracy and 
patronage. I argue that a more equal distribution of political power will 
typically increase the attractiveness of meritocracy. This is even where a 
share of the population is more motivated to support the government under 
patronage. The reason is tha t the group in power can only gain support 
through patronage as long as it controls recruitment in the future. If the two 
groups competing for the seat in government are equally powerful, patronage 
only increases the stakes without giving one group an advantage over the 
other.
One of the important limitations of the model introduced in the first 
chapter is tha t it is based entirely on the political motivation of the bureau­
crat. Bureaucrats will follow an exogenously given preference when shaping 
policy and investing into competence. The finding tha t meritocracy leads to 
competence is partially driven by this policy motivation. This shifts the at­
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tention away from wage payments, which are central element in most other 
models. In a simple model with two candidates, wage payments strengthen 
meritocracy because of their larger impact on competence. However, this 
effect depends strongly on the number of candidates competing for the wage 
price and requires an additional set of assumptions and has thus not been 
included.
On a more general level, it must be acknowledged tha t it remains unclear 
to what extent actions by bureaucrats are led by exogenously given taste 
parameters. Yet, it is not unrealistic to assume that bureaucrats have their 
own political preferences or identify themselves with specific interest groups 
in society. In this regard, it is im portant to note tha t the model only assumes 
tha t this influences their actions in the absence of objective information . 9 1  
But if one assumed tha t bureaucrats are mainly career-driven, a considerable 
part of the model would become endogenous.
Another potential problem of the model is that it conceptually separates 
patronage and meritocracy without considering a mixed system option. For 
example, there could be a meritocratic pre-selection followed by a selection 
by the politician. This idea leads back to a discussion of assumption A1 
in the first chapter; is it possible tha t two individuals have exactly the 
same level of competence? If the answer is in the negative, then there will 
always be a slight loss of competence connected to the use of patronage. 
Nonetheless, the welfare losses connected to a mixed system would then be 
minimized.
The findings presented in the first chapter have several implications for
91 To the author’s surprise, this notion found some support in a conversation with a 
junior civil servant from Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs - despite the strong norm 
of political neutrality in the United Kingdom civil service.
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future research. One possibility is to test the model empirically by using 
the data gathered by the Political Risk Services group. The group surveys 
experts on a large group of countries and across time on the degree to which 
bureaucracy tends to be somewhat autonomous from political pressure and 
has an established mechanism for recruitment and training. This seems 
sufficiently related to the notion of meritocracy to make the data interesting 
for a more thorough cross-country analysis. Another possibility for further 
research is to apply this model to the study of military organizations since 
they reflect a particularly stark conflict between competence and loyalty to 
the government of a country.
The second chapter builds a moral hazard in teams model in order to 
evaluate the validity of a widespread argument for not-for-profit dominance. 
The owner of a firm hires a worker who is keen to participate in the pro­
duction of a special output (health, poverty reduction, etc.) and receives a 
non-pecuniary benefit when production is successful. However, this intrin­
sic motivation of the worker can only be translated into wage reductions if 
the worker is left alone in the process. In other words, where the worker 
feels tha t output would be provided regardless of his efforts, he will require 
a higher financial incentive to exert effort. On the other side, where the 
owner of the firm can commit not to interfere with production, the worker 
knows that output will fully reflect his actions and will thus be more intrin­
sically motivated. Not-for-profit firms therefore achieve the same level of 
effort with lower incentive pay.
In this paper, we show tha t in order for the not-for-profit to dominate, 
it needs to provide commitment for the manager not to exert effort. If the 
commitment problem is either not im portant or impossible to solve, the 
for-profit is the optimal choice.
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Focusing on the case where the for-profit manager cannot commit, we 
find tha t the not-for-profit set-up is chosen by the manager under the con­
dition tha t he is not very motivated. Namely, both financial and intrinsic 
benefits reduce the chance tha t managers will choose the not-for-profit. The 
reason for this is tha t the not-for-profit set-up provides low wage costs by 
using worker’s intrinsic motivation effectively, but does so on account of 
efficiency and financial returns.
We also show tha t if workers can choose freely whether they want to 
work in a for-profit or a not-for-profit firm they will always choose a for- 
profit. The reason for this is tha t workers earn lower wages and receive 
lower expected intrinsic benefits (since the manager does not supply effort) 
in the not-for-profit. In order to a ttract workers, the not-for-profits would 
have to pay a higher wage and would thereby loose their attractiveness as 
an organizational form for the manager. We claim tha t with endogenous 
matching, not-for-profits do not emerge where motivated workers are rel­
atively scarce. To put it differently, oversupply of intrinsically motivated 
labour is a necessary condition for the survival of not-for-profit firms.
This last result suggests a rather pessimistic view on the link between 
not-for-profits and intrinsic motivation. Not-for-profits do not emerge be­
cause motivated workers like to work in tha t organizational environment, 
but because there is a surplus of motivated labour in these sectors. While 
the for-profit is the institutional set-up tha t achieves the first best, it is not 
chosen by unmotivated managers who have market power.
The provision of full financial incentives to the manager is often assumed 
to be associated with certain social costs. Yet, as we show in our model, 
the contractual failure is an internal one between manager and worker. This 
implies tha t the not-for-profit is not the solution to a conflict between the
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goals of the organization and society, but between manager and worker.
The analysis in the second chapter thus proposes an alternative way 
of modelling the link between intrinsic motivation and not-for-profit firms. 
One could assume tha t intrinsic motivation of both worker and manager are 
linked to the consumer surplus tha t results from the provision of output. 
Even if we drop the double moral-hazard structure, this assumption regard­
ing intrinsic motivation could still justify the use of not-for-profit firms. In 
such a model, not-for-profit firms would be used to commit to low-price pro­
vision and would therefore attract motivated managers and workers. This 
could provide a theory of not-for-profit firms based on intrinsic motivation 
tha t would entail endogenous matching and output market competition.
The third chapter develops a theory of political neutrality in the con­
text of a permanent civil service. This theory builds on the analysis of a 
simple cheap talk game which models communication between an elected 
official and a civil servant and evaluates the welfare outcomes with known 
and unknown types. I show tha t ignorance about the political views of a 
civil servant can be beneficial to the elected official. This advantage is a 
result of the politician’s assumption tha t the bureaucrat expresses average 
views. This assumption can improve communication because it reduces the 
bureaucrat’s incentives to distort her advice. While this effect is not domi­
nant for all types of bureaucrats, it can be the decisive factor in an ex-ante 
perspective.
Admittedly, the link between a permanent civil service and political neu­
trality might be a much simpler one. For example, permanent employment 
might motivate bureaucrats to remain neutral in order to advance their 
career regardless of the changes of government. It is likely tha t this ca­
reer motivated incentive for moderation is im portant in meritocratic insti­
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tutions. The change in dynamic incentive is then similar to a change in 
political preference since the bureaucrat actually behaves in line with the 
policy preference of each incoming government.
This thesis presents three models of intrinsic motivation and conflict in 
organizations. While they were developed with specific applications in mind, 
organizations involved in the provision of heterogenous public goods (parties, 
international organizations, etc.) are likely affected by similar concerns. 
Therefore, these models can serve as a useful platform on which to build 
further empirical and theoretical research.
121
References
[1] Aberbach; Joel, Robert Putnam  and Bert Rockman (1981) Bureau­
crats and Politicians in Western Democracies. Harvard University Press: 
Cambridge.
[2] Aberbach; Joel and Bert Rockman (2000) In the Web of Politics: Three 
Decades of the U.S. Federal Executive. Washington: Brookings.
[3] Acemoglu; Daron, and Simon Johnson (2005) Unbundling Institutions. 
Journal o f Political Economy, 113(5), pp. 949-995.
[4] Acemoglu; Daron, Steven Johnson and James Robinson (2001) The 
Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investi­
gation. American Economic Review, 91(5), pp. 1369-1401.
[5] Acemoglu; Daron, Davide Ticchi and Andrea Vindigni (2006) Emer­
gence and Persistence of Inefficient States. MIT Department of Eco­
nomics Working Paper Series, 06-32.
[6 ] Aghion; Philippe and Jean Tirole (1997) Formal and Real Authority in 
Organizations. Journal o f Political Economy, 105(1), pp. 1-29.
[7] Alesina; Alberto and Guido Tabellini (2007) Bureaucrats or Politicians? 
Part I: A Single Policy Task. American Economic Review, 97(2), pp. 
169-179.
[8 ] Banerjee; Priyodorshi (2007) Collective Punishments: Incentives and 
Examinations in Organisations. B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, 
7(1).
122
[9] Besley; Timothy and Stephen Coate (1997) An Economic Model of 
Representative Democracy. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 108(1), 
pp. 85-114.
[10] Besley; Timothy and Maitreesh Ghatak (2005) Competition and In­
centives with Motivated Agents. American Economic Review, 95(3), 
pp. 616-636.
[11] Besley; Timothy and Masayuki Kudamatsu (2007) Making Autocracy 
Work. Development Economics Discussion Paper Series, 48.
[12] Besley; Timothy and Torsten Persson (2007) The Origins of State Ca­
pacity: Property Rights, Taxation, and Politics. NBER Working Pa­
pers, 13028.
[13] Blume; Andreas, Oliver Board and Kohei Kawamura (2007) Noisy Talk. 
Unpublished manuscript, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh.
[14] Bornstein; David (2004) How to Change the World: Social Entrepre­
neurs and the Power of New Ideas. Oxford University Press.
[15] Caillaud; Bernard and Jean Tirole (2002) Parties As Political Interme­
diaries. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 117(4), pp. 1453-1489.
[16] Clark; Kitson (1959) ’Statesmen in Disguise’: Reflexions on the History 
of the Neutrality of the Civil Service. The Historical Journal, 2(1), pp. 
19-39.
[17] Colomer; Josep (2005) I t ’s Parties That Choose Electoral Systems (or, 
Duverger’s Laws Upside Down). Political Studies, 53(1), pp. 1-21.
123
[18] Cukierman; Alex and Mariano Tommasi (1998) W hen Does It Take a 
Nixon to Go to China? American Economic Review, 88(1), pp. 180-197.
[19] de Figueiredo; Rui (2002) Electoral Competition, Political Uncertainty, 
and Policy Insulation. American Political Science Review , 96(2), pp. 
321-333.
[20] Dessein; Wouter (2002) Authority and Communication in Organiza­
tions. Review of Economic Studies, 69(4), pp.811-838.
[21] Dimitrakas; Vassilios and Yianis Sarafidis (2005) Advice from an Expert 
with Unknown Motives. Unpublished manuscript, ENSEAD.
[22] Djankov; Simeon, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-De-Silanes and An­
drei Shleifer (2002) Regulation Of Entry. Quarterly Journal of Eco­
nomics, 117(1), pp. 1-37.
[23] Dolan; Julie (2000) Influencing Policy at the Top of the Federal Bu­
reaucracy: A Comparison of Career and Political Senior Executives. 
Public Administration Review, 60 (6 ), pp. 573-581.
[24] Dorn; Walter (1932) The Prussian Bureaucracy in the Eighteenth Cen­
tury. Political Science Quarterly, 46(3), pp. 403-423.
[25] Easley; David and Maureen O’Hara (1983) The Economic Role of the 
Nonprofit Firm. The Bell Journal o f Economics, 14 (2), pp. 531-538.
[26] Easterly; William and Ross Levine (1997) Africa’s Growth Tragedy: 
Policies and Ethnic Divisions. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112(4), 
pp. 1203-1250.
124
[27] Edwards; Teny, John Nalbandian and Kenneth Wedel (1981) Individual 
Values and Professional Education. Administration and Society, 13(2), 
pp. 123-43.
[28] Egorov; Georgy and Konstantin Sonin (2006) Dictators and Their 
Viziers. Endogenizing the Loyalty-Competence Trade-off. Mimeo, Har­
vard University.
[29] Enikolopov; Ruben (2007) Politicians, Bureaucrats and Patronage. 
Mimeo, Harvard University.
[30] Evans; Peter (1995) Embedded Autonomy. Princeton University Press: 
Princeton.
[31] Finer; S. E. (1956) The Individual Responsibility of Ministers. Public 
Administration, 34 (4), pp. 377-396.
[32] Francois; Patrick (2000) ’Public Service Motivation’ as an Argument 
for Government Provision. Journal of Public Economics, 78 (3), pp. 
275-299.
[33] Francois; Patrick (2003) Not-for-Profit Provision of Public Services. 
Economic Journal, 113, pp. C53-C6.
[34] Fry; Geoffrey (2000) The British Civil Service System. In: Hans Bekke, 
Fritz Van Der Meer (Eds.) Civil Service Systems in Western Europe, 
Edward Elgar.
[35] Glaeser; Edward and Andrei Shleifer (2001) Not-for-profit entrepre­
neurs. Journal of Public Economics, 81(1), pp. 99-115.
125
[36] Glaeser; Edward and Andrei Shleifer (2002) Legal Origins. Quarterly 
Journal o f Economics, 117(4), pp. 1193-1229.
[37] Golden; Miriam (2003) Electoral Connections: The Effects of the Per­
sonal Vote on Political Patronage, Bureaucracy and Legislation in Post­
war Italy. British Journal of Political Science, 33, pp. 189-212.
[38] Gowan; Peter (1984) The Origins of the Administrative Elite. New Left 
Review, 162, pp. 4-34.
[39] Green; Jerry and Nancy Stokey (1983) A Comparison of Tournaments 
and Contracts. Journal o f Political Economy, 91(3), pp. 349-364.
[40] Grossman; Sanford J and Oliver Hart (1986) The Costs and Benefits of 
Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration. Journal of 
Political Economy, 94(4), pp. 691-719.
[41] Haas; Stefan (2004) Die K ultur der Verwaltung. Campus: Frankfurt.
[42] Hall; Robert and Charles Jones (1999) Why Do Some Countries Pro­
duce So Much More O utput per Worker than Others? Quarterly Jour­
nal of Economics, 114(1), pp. 83-116.
[43] Hansmann; Henry (1980) The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise. Yale Law 
Journal, 89(5), pp. 835-901.
[44] Hanssen; Andrew (2004) Is There a Politically Optimal Level of Judicial 
Independence? American Economic Review, 94 (3), pp. 712-729.
[45] Hart; Oliver and John Moore (1990) Property Rights and the Nature 
of the Firm. Journal o f Political Economy, 98(6), pp. 1119-1158.
126
[46] Hart; Paul’t and Anchrit Wille (2006) Ministers and Top Officials in 
the Dutch Core Executive: Living Together, Growing Apart? Public 
Administration, 84(1), pp. 121-146.
[47] Holmstrom; Bengt (1999) Managerial Incentive Problems: A dynamic 
Prespective. Review of Economic Studies, 66(1), pp. 169-182.
[48] Holmstrom; Bengt and Paul Milgrom (1991) M ultitask Principal-Agent 
Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design. Jour­
nal of Law, Economics and Organization, 7(0), pp. 24-52.
[49] Hondeghem; Annie (2000) The National Civil Service in Belgium. In: 
Hans Bekke, Fritz Van Der Meer (Eds.) Civil Service Systems in West­
ern Europe, Edward Elgar.
[50] Horn; Murray (1995) The Political Economy of Public Administration: 
Institutional Choice in the Public Sector. Cambridge: Cambridge Uni­
versity Press.
[51] Hoskyns, Sir John (1982) W hitehall and Westminster: An Outsider’s 
View. Fiscal Studies, 3(3), pp. 162-172.
[52] Huber; John, D. (2000) Delegation to  Civil Servants in Parliamentary 
Democracies. European Journal of Political Research, 37, pp. 397-413.
[53] Ingraham; Patricia (1987) Building Bridges or Burning Them? The 
President, the Appointees, and the Bureaucracy. Public Administration 
Review, September/October, pp. 425-435.
[54] Iyer; Lakshmi and Anandi Mani (2007) Traveling Agents: Political 
Change and Bureaucratic Turnover in India. Mimeo, Harvard Business 
School and University of Warwick.
127
[55] Kawamura, Kohei (2006) Anonymity, Equal Treatment, and Over­
confidence: Constraints on Communication May Enhance Information 
Transmission. University of Oxford, Discussion Paper Series, 268.
[56] Lazear; Edward and Sherwin Rosen (1981) Rank-Order Tournaments 
as Optimum Labor Contracts. Journal of Political Economy, 89(5), pp. 
841-864.
[57] Lagunoff; Roger (2001) A Theory of Constitutional Standards and Civil 
Liberty. Review of Economic Studies, 68(1), pp. 109-132.
[58] Lakdawalla; Darius and Tomas Philipson (2006) The nonprofit sector 
and industry performance. Journal o f Public Economics, 90(8-9), pp. 
1681-1698.
[59] Leete; Laura (2001) W hither the Nonprofit Wage Differential? Esti­
mates from the 1990 Census. Journal of Labor Economics, 19(1), pp. 
136-170.
[60] Maskin; Eric and Jean Tirole (2004) The Politician and the Judge: 
Accountability in Government. American Economic Review, 94(4), pp. 
1034-1054.
[61] McCubbins; Mathew D., Roger G. Noll and Barry R. Weingast (1987) 
Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control. Journal 
of Law, Economics, & Organization, 3(2), pp. 243-277.
[62] Meininger; Marie-Christine (2000) The Development and Current Fea­
tures of the French Civil Service System. In: Hans Bekke, Fritz Van Der 
Meer (Eds.) Civil Service Systems in Western Europe, Edward Elgar.
128
[63] Mocan; Naci and Erdal Tekin (2003) Nonprofit Sector and Part-tim e 
Work: An Analysis of Employer-Employee Matched D ata on Child Care 
Workers. Review of Economics and Statistics, 85(1), pp. 38-50.
[64] Morris; Stephen (2001) Political Correctness. Journal of Political Econ­
omy, 109(2), pp. 231-65.
[65] Myerson, R.B. (1991), Game Theory: Analysis of Conflict. Harvard 
University Press, Cambridge, MA.
[6 6 ] Nistotskaya; Marina (2007) Is a Civil Service Type of Organizational 
Design of Public Bureaucracy Conducive to Economic Development? 
Evidence from Russian Regions. Mimeo. Central European University, 
Budapest.
[67] Northcote; Stafford and Charles Trevelyan (1954) Northcote-Trevelyan 
Report. Public Administration, 32 (1), pp. 1-16.
[6 8 ] Osborne; Martin and A1 Slivinski (1996) A Model of Political Compe­
tition with Citizen Candidates. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 111, 
pp 65-96.
[69] Page; Edwards (2003) The Civil Servant as Legislator: Law Making in 
British Administration. Public Administration Review, 60(6), 573-581.
[70] Page; Edwards and Bill Jenkins (2005) Policy Bureaucracy: Govern­
ment W ith A Cast of Thousands. Oxford University Press.
[71] Parrado-Diez; Salvador (2000) The Development and Current Features 
of the Spanish Civil Service System. In: Hans Bekke, Fritz Van Der 
Meer (Eds.) Civil Service Systems in Western Europe, Edward Elgar.
129
[72] Persson; Torsten and Guido Tabellini (2000) Political Economics: Ex­
plaining Economic Policy. MIT Press: London.
[73] Persson; Torsten, Gerard Roland and Guido Tabellini (1997) Separa­
tion of Powers and Political Accountability. The Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 112(4), pp. 1163-1202.
[74] Peters; Guy B. (1995) The Politics of Bureaucracy. 4th ed., Longman, 
New York.
[75] Pfiffner; James P. (1987) Political Appointees and Career Executives: 
The Democracy-Bureaucracy Nexus in the Third Century. Public Ad­
ministration Review, 47(1), pp. 57-65.
[76] Prendergast; Canice (1993) The Role of Promotion in Inducing Specific 
Human Capital Accumulation. Quaterly Journal of Economics, 108(2), 
pp. 523-534.
[77] Preston; Anne (1989) The Nonprofit Worker in a For-Profit World. 
Journal of Labor Economics, 7(4), pp. 438-463.
[78] Przeworski; Adam and Fernando Limongi (1993) Political Regimes and 
Economic Growth. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 7(3), pp. 51-69.
[79] Putnam ; Robert (1973) The Political Attitudes of Senior Servants Civil 
Servants in Western Europe: a Preliminary Report. British Journal of 
Political Science, 3(3), pp. 257-290.
[80] Rauch; James (2001) Leadership Selection, Internal Promotion, and 
Bureaucratic Corruption in Less Developed Polities. Canadian Journal 
of Economics, 34(1), pp. 240-258.
130
[81] Rauch; James (1995) Bureaucracy, Infrastructure, and Economic 
Growth: Evidence from U.S. Cities during the Progressive Era. Amer­
ican Economic Review, 85(4), pp. 968-979.
[82] Rauch; James and Peter Evans (2000) Bureaucatic Structure and Bu­
reaucratic Performance in Less Developed Countries. Journal of Public 
Economics, 75, pp. 49-71.
[83] Rowat; Colin and Paul Seabright (2006) Intermediation by aid agencies. 
Journal of Development Economics, 79(2), pp. 469-491.
[84] Ruhil; Anirudh and Pedro Camoes (2003) W hat Lies Beneath: The Po­
litical Roots of State Merit Systems. Journal of Public Administration 
Research and Theory, 13, pp. 27-42.
[85] Ryan; Alan (1972) Utilitarianism and Bureaucracy. In: Gillian Suther­
land (ed.), Studies in the Growth of Nineteenth Century Government, 
London.
[8 6 ] Smith; Adam (2001) An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the 
Wealth of Nations. London: Electric Book Co., c2001.
[87] Smith; B. (1988) Bureaucracy and Political Power. Wheatsheaf, 
Brighton.
[8 8 ] Stein, Jeremy C. (1989) Cheap Talk and the Fed: A Theory of Imprecise 
Policy Announcements. American Economic Review, 79(1), pp. 32-42.
[89] Weber; Max (1988) W irtschaft und Gesellschaft. 5th ed., Mohr Siebeck: 
Tubingen.
131
[90] Wilson; James (1989) Bureaucracy: W hat Government Agencies Do 
And Why They Do It. Basic Books: New York.
[91] Wilson; James (1961) The Economy of Patronage. Journal of Political 
Economy, 69, pp. 369-380.
[92] World Bank (2004) Doing Business in the World: Understanding Reg­
ulation. Oxford University Press.
132
A  A p p en d ix  for S ecion  1
A . l  P r o o f  o f  L em m a 4
Note first tha t the game is symmetric in payoffs. We can therefore summa­
rize payoffs in the merit system in the following table
left\right invest not invest
invest A, A B ,C
not invest C ,B D ,D
Where the respective payoffs are
*  -  5
f 1  /  ^ 1 '- e h(TT +  r) +  -7T
1
+  2 r +  t )  +  ^ (eh7T +  ( 1  -  eh) r )
B  = i(7r +  T) +  i(e^7r +  ( l - e /0 T) ~  c
1  /  ^ 1 
C = 2 eM7r +  T) +  2 ^
»  -  i
1  /  ^ 1 -e /(7 r+  r )  +  -7r
1
+  2
^(7r +  r )  +  i ( e Z7r +  ( l - e z)T)
If candidates play a mixed strategy, the probability of investment for 
each of them is
D - D
P r ( i n v e s t )  =
B - D + C - A  
or
P r ( i n v e s t )  =
\  [ { e h  -  e/)7r +  (1 -  e h )  r)] -  c
\{eh ~  ei)7T
While if c < \  (1 — e^) t  we have P r (invest) = 1 and if c  > \  [(e^ -  ei)ir +  ( 1  -  eh) r)]
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we have P r {invest) =  0. Lemma 4 follows immediately.
A .2 P r o o f  o f  L em m a  5
Denote the investment level of the right candidate by e\ and the investment 
by the left candidate by eo- We can then write the expected utility of the 
left incumbent as
*7,p a ir
we therefore have tha t
=  A
+  (1 -  A)
i(7T +  t ) +  i  (e07T +  (1 -  e0) r)
1 / n 1- e i ( 7 r  +  r )  +  - 7 r
6Up a ir
S A
^(tt +  r )  +  i  (e0 7r +  (1 -  e0) r)
1 / N 1-ei(7r +  r) +  -7T
which is simply the expected utility from a left bureaucrat minus the ex­
pected utility from a right bureaucrat. By 4^1 this is positive even if e\ >  eo 
and we therefore have
fiUpatr q
sx
A .3  P r o o f  o f  P r o p o s it io n  2
First note tha t if both bureaucratic systems imply the same level of invest­
ment for the left and right candidate, meritocracy is preferred if and only 
if P < This follows immediately from the fact th a t the left candidate is 
hired with probability \  under meritocracy and with probability p  under
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patronage. It remains to be shown that at p — \  competence is at least as 
high under meritocracy for all values of c and strictly higher for some.
If A =  \  competence under patronage is with certainty for all c < 
\  (e h  — e { )  ( t t  — t )  and e/ otherwise. By A l  we have tha t
i ( l  - e h ) r >  i  ( e h -  e i )  ( t t  -  r )
which implies tha t meritocracy leads to full competence (z = 1 ) for all 
values of c at which patronage offers e =  e^. Meritocracy therefore leads to 
a strictly higher expected utility to the left incumbent if
C €  ( i  (Gh ~ 61  ^ 6^h ~ e^ 7r + ]>(1 ~ eh) T
For higher values of c, investment into competence is low under both 
bureaucratic systems and the incumbent is indifferent between patronage 
and meritocracy at A =
A .4  L ow  p o la r iza tio n  - V io la t io n  o f  A l
If A l  is violated, recruitment under meritocracy is not affected while pa­
tronage now recruits the agent with more investment and if both agents 
invested, the politician recruits the candidate tha t matches the type of the 
politician. Similarly to the investment under meritocracy we can derive tha t 
if candidates play a mixed strategy, the probability of investment for the left 
candidate is
 _______ V ( 1  ~  e i )  t  +  \  ( e h -  e{ )  ( t r -  t )  -  c_______
( p  -  I )  ( 1  -  e h ) r  +  \ { e h -  e t )  t t  +  ( p  -  \ )  ( 1  -  e{ )  r
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and investment by the right candidate is
(1 -  p)( 1 -  ei)r + \ ( e h -  ez)(tt -  t) -  c
y  —  ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
( i  -  p) ( 1  -  eh)r  + \ ( e h -  e/)?r +  (± -  p) (eh -  ex)r  
comparing this to the probability under meritocracy
\  [(eh ~  ex)t t  +  ( 1  -  eh) r)] -  cz = —------------=---------------------------
\ ( e h - e i )  t t
we see tha t they are identical under X = p = ^ . Both bureaucratic systems 
lead to identical investment regardless of the level of c. Since p — \  the like­
lihood of recruitment for each candidate is also identical under meritocracy 
and patronage and therefore the expected utility for the left incumbent is 
the same.
A comparison of the remaining parameter space is complicated by the 
fact tha t the mixed strategy equilibrium is not symmetric under patronage. 
While a rise in p  from p  =  \  will increase the recruitment power it is not 
clear what happens to competence. It can be shown, however tha t for most 
levels of c, competence under patronage is sufficiently high to prevent any 
dominance of meritocracy for all A > ^.
To start the analysis it first helps to look at the comparison of pure 
strategy equilibria. If ^ (1 — e/l) r  <  c both candidates always invest under 
meritocracy. Under patronage, they both invest at A =  At A > \  there 
are two possibilities. Either only the left candidate invests, in which case 
he is always hired, or both candidates invest which means that the left 
candidate is hired with A >
To see this analyze the pure strategy options. Assume there is a pure 
strategy equilibrium in which only the left candidate invests. Under a pure
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strategy equilibrium the left invests (given that right does not invest) if
^(?r +  r )  +  i  (eh7t +  ( 1  -  eh)r) -  c
> V i(7r +  r )  +  i ( e Z7r +  ( l - e /)T) +  ( 1  - p ) 1 / X 1- e z(7r +  r )  +  -7r
or
( 1  -  p)  ( 1  -  ei) t  +  i  (e* -  ej) (7r -  r )  >  c
which holds because \  (e^ — e{) (tt — r) > ( 1  — e^) r  >  c.
The right candidate does not invest (given tha t the left candidate invests)
if
1 / X 1- e /l(7r +  r )  +  -7r
> V 1 /  X 1- e h{ir +  r )  +  - tt +  ( l - p ) i(?r +  r)  +  i  {ehTT +  ( 1  -  eh)r) — c
or
c > ( 1  - p )  ( 1  -  eh)
which might hold or not hold for a given combination of ^ ( 1  — e ^ ) r  <  c 
and p  > The im portant point is, however, tha t there is no equilibrium 
in which only the right candidate invests. Because, given right investment, 
the left candidate still invests if
p{  1  -  eh)r > c
which holds for all \  ( 1  — eh) t  < c and p  > \  and, hence, the left candidate 
has a dominant strategy to invest.
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From this analysis we can also see that the condition m ax {p, 1 — p] (1 — 
eh)T >  c is sufficient for a pure strategy equilibria under patronage in which 
at least one candidate is always investing into competence.
But what about other levels of c? Levels of c without investment are easy 
to analyze - again only control m atters and patronage is chosen for A >
It should be stressed in this context tha t patronage leads to investment for 
higher c than meritocracy. This can be seen through a comparison of x, y 
and z.
Furthermore, one can show th a t for all
c € \  (eh -  e{) t t  +  i  ( 1  -  eh) r ,  i  [(e* -  et)ir +  ( 1  -  eh) r)]
patronage is chosen for all A > ^ and not chosen for all A < \  as long as A 
close to The proof is available from the author upon request.
Numerical analysis of the remaining space confirms the impression gained 
by tha t the analysis of the pure strategy equilibria and the mixed strategy 
equilibria for this particular set of parameters - patronage under the violation 
of A l  is (weakly) preferred if and only if A >
A .5  P r o o f  o f  P r o p o s i t io n  3
If we review the investment decisions we get tha t under meritocracy com­
petence is high with probability
1  i f  c < \  ( 1  — eh) t
P r (competent | m erit) =  \
l - ( l - 2 : ) 2  i f  c > \ ( l - e h) r
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where
\{ eh - e { )  tt
And under patronage
P r (competent | pair) = <
1 i f  A  > cC\ B  > c
A i f  A >  c fl B  < c
(1 — A) i f  A < c C \ B > c
0 i f  A  < c fl B  < c
because the left candidate invests if
A  = p - ( n  — t ) (eh - e i ) > c
and the right candidate invests if
B  = (1 -  p) -  (tt -  r )  (eh -  ez) > c.
Meritocracy therefore dominates for investment costs tha t rule out in­
vestment under patronage but have 2: > 0 , tha t is for values
^ [(eh ~  ei)7r +  ( 1  -  eh) r] > c > ^ ( t t  -  r )  (eh -  ez)
similarly, meritocracy also (weakly) dominates for low values of c in which 
we have investment with certainty
c < - ( l - e h)T
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The crucial question is then whether
( t t - t )  (eh - e f i  > ( 1  - e h) r
or not. If the condition is fulfilled, the intrinsic motivation of a candidate 
in a power monopoly is higher than the motivation from political conflict. 
There is then an area in which investment under meritocracy is incomplete 
z < 1 but investment under patronage is high for very extreme values of 
X (because P r {competent \ patr) can only be high for these values). We 
describe these values of power distribution as high concentrations of power 
because they have to be either close to 0  or 1 .
Formally the area of patronage dominance is therefore given by the con­
dition
P r (competent \ patr) >  1 — (1 — z )2
and
(tt -  r )  (eh -  ei) > c >  ( 1  -  eh) r
If the second condition cannot be satisfied, the two areas of (weak) mer­
itocracy dominance overlap and patronage never does. Note tha t A l  allows 
for both possibilities.
A .6 P r o o f  o f  P r o p o s it io n  4
Expected utility of the incumbent under S\ = m erit  is
140
U m e rit =  [l -  (1 -  ^)2] 1 / x 1- e h (7r +  r )  +  -7 r
1
+  2
+  t ) +  ^ ( e hir +  (1 -  e h)
+ (1  -  *)5
1 / s 1- e z(7T +  T) +  -7r
1
+  2
^(7r +  r) +  i ( e i7 r + ( l - e / ) r )
where z is the investment likelihood under meritocracy. The expected utility 
under S\ = patr  is
Upatr = A i ( ? r  +  t ) +  i  ( e 07T +  (1  -  e 0 ) r )
+  (1 -  A) 1 / N 1-ei(7r +  r )  +  2 71”
where eo and ei are the left and right investment level respectively.
Now assume A =  1  and c > \  (w — r )  (e^ — e{). We have tha t Upatr > 
Umerit If
[ 1  -  ( 1  -  , ) 2] 1 /  \  1 -efc(7r +  r )  +  -7 r +
1
i ( 7 r  +  r )  +  i  ( e h7T +  (1  -  e /J  r )
1 / N 1- e z(7r +  r )  +  -7 r
< — ( t t  +  t )  +  -  ( e Z7r +  (1 — ez) r)
1
+  2
^(7r +  r )  +  i ( e Z7r +  ( l - e z)T)
or
[1 -  (1 -  2:)2] (e/» -  cz) 7r < (1 -  ez) r  +  - a R
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for z = 1 this yields the condition in the proposition. The proposition 
follows from the fact that z is falling in c. If the condition holds for z =  1 
it will hold for all >2 < 1 .
W ith z =  ( l -  c7^(1 ~et )T, 0 |
I  ^(eh-ei)n J 
l _  / c — |  ( 1  — efc)r \ 2
\  H eh ~  e‘)r  )
which shows tha t 7r always benefits meritocracy.
B A ppendix for Section 2
B . l  D isc u ss io n  o f  C o n tra ctu a l A ssu m p tio n s
Assume first tha t wages can only be made contingent on the final success 
of the project but not on intermediate output. We then have w\ = W2 . 
Given proposition 1 the potential advantage of the not-for-profit is tha t the 
manager can use the reduction of a  to create commitment. The not-for- 
profit manager will then set w ^ p  such tha t the worker’s IC constraint is 
binding and a* such that he commits himself to no effort in case the worker 
does not succeed.
But if we examine equation 1, we can see tha t commitment can also be 
reached by setting a higher wage wpp. Due to the fact tha t we assumed 
w\ = u>2 , the effect on first stage expected utility of the manager is identical 
to the effect of a reduction in a. In both cases the expected first stage utility 
is equal to the second stage expected utility.
h(0M +  tt — wpp)  = h(0M +  a*(ir — wjvp)) — 1
(eh -  e{) tt < (1 -  ej) r  +  - a R
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and the for-profit set-up can perfectly mimic the not-for-profit set-up. This 
rules out not-for-profit dominance.
This does not change under a more general setting where both final and 
intermediate output are contractible, i.e. w\ ^  W2 . The only change to the 
scenario above is th a t the for-profit manager can now use the wage W2 to 
commit to no effort and both managers can use the wage w\ to make the 
worker IC bind. However, note tha t W2 is a better instrument than a  to 
reach commitment as it does not reduce the payoff in the first period. The 
wage on intermediate output will be used by both organizational forms in 
the same way. The not-for-profit can therefore never be better than the 
for-profit.
Given our proposition 1 we can focus on the case in which the manager 
tries to reach commitment to no effort and check whether the not-for-profit 
dominates. Observe tha t the binding IC constraint of the manager implies 
th a t the second stage expected payoff is independent of the way commitment 
is reached. The expected second stage payoff is always
h { 0 M  +  TT —  W 2 , F p )  =  h ( ^ M  +  Ot* {1T —  W 2 , N p ) )  =  1
where ic2 ,fp  and u>2 ,JVP refer to wages based on final output under for-profits 
and non-profits.
Therefore, all we have to compare is the first period expected utility of 
the manager. But because first and second stage wages can be set inde­
pendently under this contracting regime, the for-profit wage will just be set 
such tha t the IC constraint is binding. The for profit wage is then given by
h(0\v +  w i ,f p ) — 1
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which implies tha t w itpp  =  w \^P -  The only difference between for- and 
not-for-profit is therefore that the not-for-profit reaches commitment by re­
duction of ot to ex* 1  as well as payment of a second-stage wage while the 
for-profit does it only through payment of a second-stage wage. The result 
is immediate.
If commitment is beneficial for the manager, providing it by paying a 
second stage wage is cheaper than reducing the profit share allocated to the 
manager. The reason is tha t the cost in second stage payoff is the same 
between the two ways of commitment. But reducing a  also reduces retained 
profits while paying a second stage wage does not.
B .2  A lte r n a t iv e  N o t-fo r -p r o fit  S e tt in g
Assume tha t the not-for-profit set up is captured by a  = 0. In tha t case, 
worker intrinsic motivation has no impact on manager welfare as he is in­
different between different wage regimes.
Now the manager’s expected payoff under a not-for-profit is
h0M-
The manager’s payoff under a for-profit is
h(7r — w + 0m ) +  ( 1  -  h) {h(ir +  0m ) -  1 } •
This implies tha t the not-for-profit dominates if
h0M > h(7r — w + 0m ) +  ( 1  — h) {h(ir +  0m ) -  1 }
144
or
0  >  h ( 7T — w) + (l — h )  { h ( 7T +  0 m )  — 1 } •
Recall tha t we assumed tha t 7r — w < 0 cannot hold. By A l we further have 
th a t h ( i r  +  & m )  > 1  and, hence, the condition can never hold.
B .3  In c lu s io n  o f  W orker in  F or-profit
The two options for a wage in the for-profit firm are w = 0 and w = wpp  
- either, the manager ignores the worker or he pays her the minimum wage 
needed to make her exert effort. In order to show the optimality of wpp  we 
only have to prove tha t the manager would never want to ignore the worker 
and pay no wage. The manager prefers to pay no wage and just exert effort 
by himself if
h ( 7 r  +  0 M )  -  1 >  h ( 7r -  w p p  +  0 m )  +  ( 1  -  h ) h  (7r -I- 6 m )  — 1
where the right hand side of this inequality is just a mix between the first 
stage outcome of worker effort, tt — wpp + 0M and the second stage outcome 
of manager effort, h ( n  + 6 m )  — 1. The left hand side just features manager 
effort and so all the weight is on the second stage. The simple condition for 
the manger to prefer ignoring the worker is then
h  ( tt +  6 m )  — 1 >  t t  — w p p  +  6 m
inserting the wage, wpp  from above we get tha t this condition is fulfilled if
h ( 7r +  6m ) — 1  > r  [h (tt +  6m ) — 1 ] +  ( 1  — h)6w  h,
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which is a clear contradiction given th a t by A l  : h {it +  6 m )  — 1 >  0.
C A ppendix for Section 3
C .l  E q u ilib r iu m  w ith  K n o w n  T y p e s
Note first tha t given two actions Xh and x i , the utility difference of sending 
a signal towards one or the other action is a weakly monotone, continuous 
function in b and will always be 0 for some value of b. Hence, the bureaucrat 
follows a strategy in which she switches from sending the signal n = low to 
n =  high at some specific point sp(b). In equilibrium, this point determines 
the beliefs of the politician on m. Given the uniform prior on m, conditional 
beliefs are
E (m  | n = low) = ^ sp  (b)
and
E (m  | n  =  high) = ^  [1 — sp (6 )]
Equilibrium messaging by the biased bureaucrat requires both actions to 
give her the same utility a tm  =  sp(b). W ith xi < sp(b)+b and Xh > sp(b)+b 
we can describe this condition through the equation
sp(b) + b — xi = Xh — sp(b) — b 
and this can be rewritten to
/»\ Xl Xh .
sp{b) = ----^------- b
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This equation is equivalent to the no-arbitrage equation in CS. It implies 
tha t the point at which the sender switches will not be the average between 
the two equilibrium actions but is lower for b > 0. The receiver takes this 
fact into account when forming beliefs about the state of the world given 
the signals low or high. Given n = low the politician will chose the action
_  sp(b)
X i ~ ~ r
and
_  1 +  sp(b) 
h 2
if n = high. Or with sp{b) plugged in
x t  = \ - b
and
x i  = i ~ b
C .2  W elfare  w ith  C o m m itm en t
We model trust through a commitment to the actions
Given these actions, the switching point of the bureaucrat will be sp(b) =  
\  — b and ex ante utility of the politician is
For |6 | <  |  this can be simplified to
EUpo, = - \ ~ b 2
For \  >  |b| >  \
EUpoi =  - i  -  ib 2 -  i  |6|
And finally for \b\ > \  the bureaucrat will only send one kind of signal, 
the utility for the politician is then E U r  =  —yg-
We compare these outcomes to the ex ante utility the politician receives 
if he cannot commit to believe the bureaucrat and chooses the action x* = ^ . 
His expected utility in tha t case is E U r  =  — Taking a look at the different 
intervals above we see tha t the politician will be indifferent between trust 
and x* = \  for some \  > \b\ > To be precise he will ex ante prefer to 
commit if
or
1*1 <
y/l5  — 2
148
C .3  E q u ilib r iu m  w ith  U n k n o w n  T y p e s
First note th a t the equilibrium actions xi and Xh are still given by the 
conditional means
0
J  f { b ) s p { b ) ^ d b
xi =  E (m  | n = ”low”) = —9—-------------------
J  f(b)sp(b)db
- 0
and
0
J -  sp(b))1+s£ {b) db
Xh — E (m  | n = ”high” ) =  — — -----------------------------
J / W ( l  -  sp(b))db 
- 0
Note tha t the politician updates his beliefs on m  according to bayes 
rule. Most importantly, he incalculates the probability tha t the signal is 
sent by an bureaucrat with type b. We can simplify these terms by noting 
th a t the switching points will never be smaller than 0  or larger than 1 , i.e. 
sp(b | b > 0 ) =  m ax( 0 , sp(0 ) — 6 ), sp(b | 6  <  0 ) =  rm n(l, sp(0) — b).
The equilibrium action for n — low is then
sp( 0)
J  f(b) [sp{b)2} db +  F(sp(0 ) -  1)
1 sp(0)—1 
Xl 2  sp(o)
J  f(b)sp(b)db +  F(sp( 0 ) -  1 )
sp(0)—1
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Now note th a t the actions xi and Xh have to fulfill the following condition 
Xl+^ h = sp(0) =  This finding rests on the assumption of a symmetric 
distribution of types. Note tha t the symmetric distribution implies tha t for 
any sp(0 ) there are equally many types with a switching point larger sp(0 ) 
and lower sp(0). For sp(0) =  \  the ex ante probability of receiving a signal 
n =  high is therefore exactly For sp(0) >  \  the probability of n  =  high 
is then strictly lower Why will this always lower the expected utility of 
the politician?
Regardless of the signal sent, the politician tries to minimize the expected 
distance between the action, x, and the state of the world, m.  If sp(0) 
increases, this expected distance must increase for n =  low and decrease for 
n =  high. The politician therefore raises the ex-ante probability of getting 
a lower expected payoff by playing actions tha t violate sp(0 ) =
W ith sp(0) =  \  we can simplify the nominator
sp(0 ) 0 . 5
J  [sp(&)2] db =  J  f(b ) [sp(0 ) 2  -  2 sp(0 ) 6  +  b2] db
sp(0) — 1 —0.5
0.5
( l _ 2 f  ( _ ! ) ) ! +  j  f (b)62.  ,  'ldb
-0 .5
and the denominator
sp(0)
J  f(b)sp(b)db 1 - 2  F ( - i ) sp( 0)
sp(0 ) —1
The low action of the politician is then given by
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0.5
(2 F ( 1 ) -  1 ) 1  + +  1 - ^ ( 5 )
xi
-0.5
[2 F (J )  -  1 ] |  +  1  -  F ($)
0.5
( 2 F ( i ) - l ) i +  j  f (b)b2d b + l - F ( ±)
-0.5
F ( k )
0.5J  m *
- 0.5
db
Similarly we can rewrite for the action triggered by the signal n  =  high
sp(  0 )
J  /(&X1 -  sp(b)2)db +  F ( - s p ( 0))
1 sp(0)—1
2  -sp(O)
/
sp(0)—1
J  /(*>)(! -  sp{b))db + F ( - s p ( 0))
sp(0)
( l _ 2 F ( _ i ) ) _  j  f{b )sp(b)2db + F ( - i )
sp(  0)  —1
0.5
=  1  1
4  2
( 1  -  2 F ( - i ) ) i  +  j  m b '
-0.5
-  J  f(b)b2db
db
- 0.5
Note tha t there are two equilibria: babbling and the one described here.
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Both parties ex ante weakly prefer to be in the informative one. The bu­
reaucrat can trigger the action tha t he likes more and therefore even ex post 
prefers the informative equilibrium. The politician either chooses actions 
x l — x h — \  or he strictly prefers to be in the informative equilibrium. As 
long as there is some probability tha t the bureaucrat is of a type b 6  (— , 
the bureaucrat will have two distinctly different actions. If the share of rad­
ical bureaucrats is large, i.e. as F (—^ ), 1 — F{ \ )  —> the actions of the 
decision maker are close to
